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ARE WE BUYERS OR HOSTS?
A MEMETIC APPROACH TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Jeffrey Evans Stake*
Laura: "Would you please stop singing that song?"
Alison: "I want to, but I can't get it out of my head."
Laura, a minute later: "Oh no! You gave it to me."
Alison: "Well, don't blame me; you gave it to me in the first
place."
INTRODUCTION
Are my daughters crazy? They think that a simple song can repeat
itself in their heads against their wills. They talk about an idea, in this
case a musical, lyrical idea, as if it is something beyond the control of
the mind. My children are not crazy. They are onto something impor-
tant, and it is something not fully recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court. My daughters know that ideas are not inert; they have
the power to replicate despite the efforts of humans to control them.
Richard Dawkins developed this point, coining the term "meme" to
refer to ideas (or bits of information) that replicate.' Dawkins's com-
parison of ideas to genes suggests that ideas have an existence of their
- For their thoughtful comments, I thank Fred Aman, Kevin Brown, Dan Conkle, Ken-
neth Dau-Schmidt, Terry Denny, Robert Fischman, Nicholas Georgakopoulas, Oliver Goode-
nough, Cheryl Hanna, Joseph Hoffmann, John Humbach, Steve Johnson, William Naugle, Val
Nolan, Judge Richard Posner, Harry Pratter, Eric Rasmusen, John Scanlan, Warren F.
Schwartz, Gene Shreve, Robert Stake, Susan Williams, and Janet Stake. I am especially in-
debted to Steven Goldberg and Owen Jones for cautionary warnings and Robert Frank for en-
couragement. I thank the Gruter Institute for inviting me to present this idea at its annual con-
ference in 1997, and the Law and Society Association for the friendly but skeptical welcome its
members gave this paper at the annual meeting in 1996, and my Indiana colleagues for a similar
reception at a faculty workshop on October 19, 1994.
1. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (1989). Dawkins coined the term "meme"
to sound like "gene." Memes are relatively small ideas that are often found grouped together in
meme-complexes in somewhat the same way that genes are often found grouped together in gene
complexes. This Article uses the term "ideas" in a way that includes both memes and meme-
complexes. My use here of "meme" to refer to replicating bits of information is broader than
Dawkins's, which is limited to cultural information. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED
PHENOTYPE: THE LONG REACH OF THE GENE 290 (1989).
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own, separate from the lives of their carriers.2 Although some are lazy,
not all ideas wait passively for us to choose to express them. The ag-
gressive, over-achieving ones find a way to elbow themselves into our
conversation and sometimes even manage to monopolize it. Ideas have
a way of constructing their own environment, using us for both their
raw materials and labor force.
Despite the fact that ideas do not sit passively like products in an
ordinary market, our First Amendment jurisprudence is built on a
"marketplace" metaphor. That metaphor leads to the comfortable con-
clusion that the best ideas will survive and ideas not useful to humans
will die off. Although this "marketplace of ideas" model has suffered
much criticism,' it will likely persist as a normative framework for
analyzing First Amendment issues until we find a better model.4 Before
we can shelve the marketplace metaphor, we need another way to think
about ideas. One purpose of this Article is to show that the new science
of memetics offers us an alternative to the marketplace metaphor.
The memetic perspective differs deeply from the traditional mar-
ketplace viewpoint. Embedded in the usual approach is the notion that
ideas are essentially human creations; man is the creator, he looks
down from above on his ideas, and they remain within his control. The
memetic perspective suggests that ideas arise from below. They de-
velop and grow, building on themselves, evolving. They grow within a
culture, our culture, but they develop far beyond the human control
implicit in the marketplace metaphor. Just as we cannot expect nature
or the economy to be one harmonious whole, 5 we cannot expect ideas
to live in harmony with themselves or with us because they too are not
designed from above.
Recognizing memes as ideas with the power to replicate thus im-
mediately suggests the critical distinction between the interests of ideas
and the interests of people. The goal identified by Darwinian analysis
is to prevent memes from using harm and threats of harm to their hu-
man vessels as a tactic to compete with other ideas. Thus, an evolu-
tionary approach to ideas may help us build a foundation for a person-
centered jurisprudence of free speech. And beyond that, by exploring
2. The idea that ideas have true agency, rather than just metaphoric agency, dates back at
least to Hegel. See generally GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1952).
3. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2356-61 (1989); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win
Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 863 (1996).
4. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
5. Matt Ridley has said about economics and biology, "At the root of both disciplines lies
the notion that, if the balance of nature was not designed from above but emerged from below,
then there is no reason to think it will prove to be a harmonious whole." MATT RIDLEY, THE
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 252 (1998).
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memetics, I also hope to show more broadly how an evolutionary per-
spective can be useful in both positive and normative analysis of law.
Shifting from theory to practical application, another goal of this
Article is to devise a formulation of our Constitution's protection of
speech that would allow states to punish some truly harmful speech.
Consider the idea expressed in the so called "Nuremberg Files" web
site. That site suggested that Justice O'Connor should be killed for
supporting abortion rights. Because it could increase the danger that
Justices will be murdered or maimed, perhaps it ought to be outlawed.6
On the other hand, outlawing harmful speech also carries obvious
costs. As the Supreme Court has said, "The vitality of civil and politi-
cal institutions in our society depends on free discussion." 7 Opportuni-
ties for free speech are highly prized goods, valued for the benefits
they generate for both speaker and audience, valued as a means to fos-
ter democracy and as a check on the abuse of political power, and val-
ued as essential steps in the pursuit of truth.8 As John Stuart Mill said,
"[I]f any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion for aught we can
certainly know, be true." 9 Thus, there are obvious dangers in
suppressing speech. Our goal should be to strike a balance that
optimally reduces both dangers.
If we were to maximize human welfare, we would outlaw speech
when it does more harm than good. But identifying such speech is dif-
ficult, orders of magnitude harder than determining how best to pro-
mote safety on public highways. Not only is information scarce, but we
cannot trust the decision-makers to ignore their self-interest and pro-
mote only the public weal. Governmental balancing of policy concerns
in the free-speech arena is especially problematic because uncon-
strained lawmakers could apply their power to regulate speech to the
end of keeping themselves in power rather than promoting the public
interest. If a mayor uses the power of city government to improve the
roads to his private home, the public can choose to not re-elect him.
But when lawmakers outlaw political speech to protect themselves from
recall, they eliminate a critical link in the feedback mechanism we rely
6. A formulation of the First Amendment that would allow such speech to be outlawed is
presented and discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 92.
7. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
8. "[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength.
Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open
encounter?" JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 50 (1644). But there is the rub. How can we assure
free and open encounters? For discussion of whether free speech leads to truth, see, e.g.,
FREDERICK SHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-35 (1982) and Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984).
9. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. II. (1859).
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on for correcting governmental errors. If elected officials were com-
pletely free to decide which speech falls on the harmful side of the bal-
ance, they would have both the incentive and opportunity to penalize
ideas that conflict with their own. Their self-serving regulations on
speech might well not be rectified through the political process. Argu-
ments to the effect that the ruling party is destroying the economy or
our community need protection from the wrath of the ruling party.
Legislators, acting in the gravity of self interest, can be expected to
slide down the slippery slope to a point where too much speech is pun-
ished. Since we can expect the decision-makers to outlaw too much
political speech, a constitutional constraint will push them back toward
the optimum. Of course it is hard to say where that optimum lies and
we cannot know for sure when the constitution has pushed enough. But
it seems likely that the marketplace metaphor pushes legislatures back
too far. The First Amendment as now read protects some speech that
generates far more harm than good. Indeed, the current reading of the
First Amendment threatens freedom of speech.
The reason the First Amendment threatens free speech relates to
the fact that we rely on a number of negative feedback loops to limit
the spread of bad ideas. One of those loops is the familiar one just
mentioned. When legislators' ideas are too far from the mainstream,
their constituents vote them out of office. The First Amendment pre-
vents politicians from cutting off this democratic feedback loop by
passing laws that would silence those who speak out to oppose their
bad ideas.
There is another, equally important, negative feedback loop. Citi-
zens react to the ideas voiced by other members of the community.
Those knowing the truth frequently respond to those who speak false-
hoods, just as Mill assumes."0 In some ways, however, this civil feed-
back loop is more fragile than the democratic feedback loop. While
voters respond to politicians with both their voices and votes, they can
respond to other voters only with their voices. Moreover, the ballot
box is protected from scrutiny whereas public speech is, by its very
nature, open to scrutiny and reaction. Exploiting this weakness, some
special meme-complexes cut off the non-political feedback loop by
silencing their opposition. At present, the First Amendment protects
these ideas, thus jeopardizing our freedom to speak. The practical goal
of this Article is to refine our First Amendment jurisprudence in a way
that gives lawmakers the power to punish this latter sort of speech-
speech which cuts off the non-political feedback loop-without giving
them the power to cut off the democratic feedback loop so rightly
10. MILL, supra note 9, at ch. II.
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prized by traditional defenders of free speech.
The Article will unfold as follows. The first task is to develop the
notion that some ideas have the ability to replicate. An easy example is
the 1999 computer worm, "Melissa," which replicated perhaps faster
than any earthly idea ever, at least until the "Love Bug" came along.
12
Ideas can also reproduce in human brains. I attempt to catalog some of
the ways ideas get people to pass them on. On this point, I am not
merely suggesting a new metaphor for ideas, that they behave "like"
replicators. Ideas are themselves replicators. And it is their power of
replication that creates the danger. It is not just people that are the
problem. Focusing on people as the actors fails to convey the essential
point that ideas are not wholly within our control.
After that admittedly difficult first step, the next step is a small
one. Some replicators in the world of ideas are not going to make life
better for people. We would be better off if those ideas did not exist,
or were not allowed to replicate. I identify some types of ideas that
present a potential danger to people and explain why bad speech cannot
be counteracted with good speech.
Next, I define some of the dangerous ideas that legislatures could
curb without undermining the democratic political process. I suggest
that the Constitution should be read to allow governments to punish
speech that advocates physical injury to speakers of opposing ideas.
After proposing that radical exception to First Amendment protection
of political ideas, the Article examines some applications to specific
behaviors, including anti-abortion speech and hate crimes. It will be
admitted that such speech that does more harm than good would still be
protected by the First Amendment. Finally, I argue that my proposed
exception, although only a narrow modification of the current law,
could make a life-saving difference.
This Article, one of the first to apply memetics to legal issues, 3
11. I understand that there is an argument that the slippery slope in interpreting the First
Amendment is so slippery that we will slide down it into the depths of too much governmental
suppression of speech unless we carve only the clearest and simplest of exceptions. First, I do
not buy that argument because courts, not the people and their legislators, will flesh out the
contours of any exception and they can handle subtleties. Second, I hope to propose an excep-
tion that is not so subtle that it is beyond lay understanding.
12. See Lev Grossman, Attack of the Love Bug, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 49, 50. In the
wake of viruses, a new form of meme, the virus hoax, has become popular. Virus hoaxes use
the power of our fear of viruses to spread themselves. Some computer software companies have
virus hoax centers for maintaining information on hoaxes.
13. Despite the fact that numerous books and articles have developed the idea of memes,
see, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 1221 (1995);
DANIEL DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE
(1995); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION (1996); SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME
MACHINE (1999); few law review articles focused on memes before the turn of the millennium.
For one such, see Michael Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 291 (spring 1999).
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fits within a larger, emerging effort to apply the tools and perspective
of evolutionary science to problems in law. 14 The emerging discipline
has at least two major branches. One branch attempts to use what evo-
lutionary science knows about humans to improve understanding and
prediction of human behavior in response to varying legal rules. 5
Rather than looking to establish differences between people, evolution-
ary psychologists seek to describe the psychic unity of mankind.
16
Working on that foundation, the goal of evolutionary legal scholars is
to explore the legal implications of our universally shared architecture.
Another branch attempts to apply evolutionary analysis not to humans,
but to the law itself. This group sees law as an evolving entity. poten-
tially subject to the same forces that affect the evolution of other or-
ganisms. 7
The present project fits between the two branches in that the unit of
evolutionary analysis is not humans or the law, but ideas in general. Its
central assumption is that knowing more about how ideas evolve could
help us to frame better laws regarding speech. It shares with the first
branch a hope that the law can be made a better instrument for social
good. It shares with the second, perhaps loftier, branch a belief that
the methods of evolutionary analysis can help us understand the devel-
14. Some of the academics interested in this effort formed an organization, The Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law ("SEAL"), in early 1998. For a competing description of Law
and Biology, see E. Donald Elliot, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
595 (1997). For a wide ranging discussion, see the Symposium issue on Law, Human Behavior
and Evolution in Volume 8 of the Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues (1997), and for applica-
tions of evolutionary analysis to criminal law, see Symposium: Biology, Behavior, & the Crimi-
nal Law, 22 VT. L. REV. 263 (1997) and see also William H. Rogers, Where Environmental
Law and Biology Meet: Of Panda's Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993).
15. Appeals to genetic science have in the not so distant past been employed to justify some
of the most horrible crimes against people this world has ever known. See STEPHAN L.
CHOROVER, FROM GENESIS TO GENOCIDE: THE MEANING OF HUMAN NATURE AND THE POWER
OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL 77-109 (1979) (tracing the frightening misuse of biology in recent
times). The policy implications of genetics cannot be discussed without calling to mind eugenics
and the unfathomable suffering it caused. As Jonathan Weiner states "the study of genes and
behavior defines the depth as well as the height of the twentieth century, because it traveled in
both directions, like angels ascending and descending Jacob's ladder. The gas chambers of the
Holocaust were built on Galton's principles." JONATHAN WEINER, TIME, LOVE, MEMORY 94
(1999). We ought not forget, however, that evolution was not the first form of science deployed
by racists. See STEVEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 43 (1981) (describing the great
Swiss naturalist, Louis Agassiz, as a leading spokesman for polygyny). The point of this Article
is to develop both a theory and practical approach for immunizing our culture against the kinds
of ideas that have in the past led to the racist-inspired killing of humans. My whole point is to
argue against "survival of the fittest" as a normative touchstone.
16. See JEROME H. BARKOW ET AL., THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 79 (1992).
17. So far, the research has focused on the application of chaos theory. It can be hoped
that, at some point, these researchers will address some of the claims made by law and econom-
ics about the evolution of the law toward efficiency. See, e.g., GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE RISE OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1982).
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opment of the law and other ideas just as they help us understand car-
bon-based life forms.
We can usefully compare law and evolutionary science to law and
economics. The economic model starts with selfish behavior of people.
Evolution science starts similarly, but with a different unit of selection;
biology starts with the selfish gene rather than the selfish individual.
This focus on the gene and its propagation extends the "life" of the
organism indefinitely, making it easy to see why one individual would
sacrifice herself for another, a behavior that is harder to explain when
starting with a selfish individual. In addition, the evolutionary perspec-
tive helps to understand preferences; preferences need no longer be
taken as exogenous.
However, in many ways the economic and biological perspectives
overlap; what is good for the individual is often good for her genes.
For that reason, a researcher applying the evolutionary approach would
often make the same predictions and prescriptions as would be made by
someone taking the economic approach. To the extent of the overlap,
we cannot expect law and biology to have the same kind of impact as
economics did in the early days of law and economics. Law and biol-
ogy is simply not different enough from law and economics in its cen-
tral paradigm to have that kind of impact. Nevertheless, the biological
perspective can often fine-tune the economic analysis and occasionally
lead to dramatically different conclusions.
This Article pushes the evolutionary approach beyond the selfish
human of economics and beyond the selfish gene of biology to the self-
ish meme. It is hoped that the evolutionary approach will, in this in-
stance, offer a dramatically different perspective from the economic
approach. Whereas the marketplace metaphor carries with it a sense of
consumer sovereignty, the biological perspective makes clear that we
should expect competition between information encoded in DNA and
information encoded in books.
I. THE NATURE OF IDEAS
For purposes of this Article, an idea is a set of connections that
could exist in a person's brain and could be recognized as an idea by
that brain. An idea can range from a fashion to a philosophy. It could
be the thought expressed in a single word, a phrase, a sentence, or a
series of sentences, all the way up to a collection of thoughts large
enough to be called a religion or "the law." For a thing to be an idea,
it must be possible for the thing to reside in our heads, but it need not
be expressed or even expressible in the words available in human lan-
12192001]
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guages. " Nor need the idea be contained in any brain. An idea can be
entirely forgotten and still exist in written form.
Here Dawkins might make a distinction between ideas and memes.
For him, memes exist in brains. 19 The expression of a meme, on paper
or in action, is the phenotype of the meme, but it is not the meme. I
prefer to view the meme as being able to exist outside of our brains.
One criterion for distinguishing phenotypes from genotypes is that the
mutilation of a phenotype is not replicated whereas a change to a gene
is replicated."0 Cutting the tails off rats does not lead to offspring with-
out tails, whereas altering a gene in a sperm or an egg could lead to
infinite generations without tails. On this criterion, however, it would
seem that a meme can exist on the piece of paper. As I type, I create
replications of my ideas in the memory of the computer. I also err,
often, in my typing. Nearly all of these errors are nonsense, but an
occasional one is a slight improvement on the meme in my head. From
then on, it is the typographic mutation instead of the original meme
that reproduces. Since unintentional changes to the paper can subse-
quently reproduce, it would seem that the words on the paper are the
meme rather than merely a phenotype of the meme.
I do not think it critical at this juncture to define whether an idea
can reside in locations other than brains, such as in books or on mag-
netic hard disks. Nor need we settle whether it might exist as a set of
simultaneous or sequential electro-chemo-mechanical connections in
the head of some nonhuman animal with a nervous system. Fortu-
nately, for the analysis here, having a precise definition of "idea" is
not essential. In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins demonstrates the
power of the concept of genetic evolution without describing precisely
how much genetic material it takes to make a "gene."'" Similarly, as
he notes, we can share some useful and entertaining thoughts about
memes without nailing down the definition of a "meme."'
Ideas can replicate. In this way, ideas are like viruses and bacteria.
When an idea takes the form of a computer virus, it has the power to
make copies of itself, spreading from one computer to another without
the help of any human being, in some cases even circumventing the
efforts to keep it from propagating. Like a bacterium, it draws on the
18. If Steven Pinker is right, we think in mentalese, not in a language. STEVEN PINKER,
THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 56-57 (1994). Albert Einstein said, "These thoughts did not come in
any verbal formulation. I rarely think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express
it in words afterward." H. EVES, MATHEMATICAL CIRCLES ADIEU 59 (Boston: Prindle, Weber
& Schmidt, 1977).
19. DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE, supra note 1, at 109.
20. Id. at 97-99.
21. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE, supra note 1, at 28-33.
22. See id. at 195-96.
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resources around it and uses them to make a copy of itself. Just as a
human body is a gene's way of making another gene, 23 a computer hard
disk is a meme's way of making another meme. But most ideas are
much more dependent on living hosts than computer viruses are. Like
biological viruses, they rely directly on outside organisms for their
replication. A funny joke that I cannot resist retelling employs me as a
vehicle for its reproduction. An idea about free speech in my head may
be reproduced by my writing it down for you to read. I supply all of
the material and calories for its new expression. It supplies only the
intellectual content. Unlike most viruses, but like many bacteria,
memes can be good for people. Like bacteria and viruses, an idea may
be active or dormant.
Between memes and genes, the meme is actually the larger con-
cept. After all, genes are information chemically encoded on a double
helix. The genes in each of my cells contains the idea of a human be-
ing. Thus genes are memes of a particular kind, a kind that does its
replicating only in somewhat fragile, carbon-based vehicles. Despite
the fact that genes could be considered a sort of meme, I will continue
to use the term "meme" to refer to reproducing ideas other than those
embodied in DNA.
There is some historical irony in trying to use genes to explain
memes. When Seymore Benzer was creating his path-breaking mapping
of the rlI gene in the 1950s, he had a hard time explaining what he was
doing. To make it understandable, he analogized to typographical er-
rors.24 He identified five different sorts of error, substitutions ("Attila
and his Nuns"), deletions ("I can speak just as good nglish as you"),
insertions ("I have no fears that Mr. Khrushchev can contaminate the
American people. We can take in stride the best brain washington he
can offer"), inversions (upsidedown type), and nonsense.' Of course
memes can mutate by intentional action as well as, indeed better than,
by error. In the '50s, mutation of genes was a mystery; today the pub-
lic is more familiar with the idea of genetic mutation than memetic
mutation.
II. NATURAL SELECTION
The key ingredients for Darwinian evolution by natural selection
are reproduction and variation.2 6 Reproduction, or replication, or copy-
23. Jonathan Weiner attributes the following to Samuel Butler: "A hen is only an egg's way
of making another egg." WEINER, supra note 15, at 129.
24. Id. at 57.
25. Id.
26. BARKOW Er AL., supra note 16, at 50 (quoting Darwin). Death is probably an important
ingredient as well. Evolution can occur without death, but natural selection implies that some
20011 1221
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ing, implies some fidelity to the original, and therefore implies "in-
heritance" of some of the characteristics of the original. The other
essential requirement is variation; the reproduction must be imperfect
in some instances so that there are differences within the population of
replicators. Reproduction requires fidelity to the original and variation
requires infidelity. Variation is what allows evolution to reach new
locations in the conceptual space of all possible designs.27 Once there is
reproduction with variation, there are differences in the pool of repro-
ducing organisms. When there are differences, some of those differ-
ences will matter when it comes to further reproduction. Differences
like a greater ability to protect one's own progeny from harm will en-
hance replication. Other differences, such as those leading to sterility
or premature death, will impede replication. Thus, variation will lead
to differential reproduction. Differences in rates of reproduction will
lead to differences in relative population. Unless they die too quickly,
the better replicators will tend to be more populous than the poorer
replicators.
We ordinarily think of Darwinian evolution in the context of bio-
logical development. The genes present in one generation differ from
those in the previous generation in a couple of ways. One difference is
in relative frequency. Because of sexual selection, natural selection,
and artificial selection, some genes are more common and others less
common than in the previous generation. Another difference is that
there are new genes that did not exist in the previous generation. For
various physical and chemical reasons, copies are not always exactly
the same as the original gene, they are mutations. For most of earth's
biological history, genes changed by random accidents, but with ge-
netic engineering we have introduced new means by which genes can
change. We have developed the ability to modify genes in somewhat
predictable ways.
Ideas too can evolve by natural selection. Both key requirements
are met. First, ideas can reproduce. One interesting example is the idea
embodied in a letter, called the Saint Jude letter, received by both my
colleague, Oliver Goodenough, and me. These letters are reproduced
things survive and some become extinct. However, "differential reproduction (and not survival
per se) is the engine that drives natural selection." Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary
Psychology: A Primer, (visited Mar. 10, 2001)
< http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html >.
According to Robert Trivers, natural selection is the result of any system that combines hered-
ity, variation, and differential reproduction. ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 28-29
(1985).
27. The design space of ideas is simply the set of all possible ideas thought of as forming a
multidimensional space in which closely related ideas sit next to each other. For an elaborate
development of this idea, see generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (1995).
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(yet again) below.
Letter received by Jeff Stake
Kiss someone you love
Kiss someone you love when you
get this letter & make magic.
With love all things are possible.
This paper has been sent to you
for Good Luck. The original is
in New England. It has been
around the world nine times.
The luck has been sent to you.
You will receive good luck
within four days of receiving this
letter & you must, in turn, send
luck.
This is no joke.
Send no money. Send copies to
people you think need luck.
Don't send money as fate has no
price.
Do not keep this letter, it must
leave your hands within 96
hours. A Pan Am Officer re-
ceived $170,000.00. Joe Elliot
received $70,000.00 & lost it
because he broke the chain while
in the Philippines.
Cane Walsh lost his wife 6 days
after receiving this letter. He
failed to circulate the letter.
However, before her death he
received $7,775.00. Please send
20 copies & see what happens
within 4 days.
The chain comes from Venezuela
& was written by Saul Manthony
Degrong, a missionary from
Letter received by Oliver
Goodenough
With Love All Things are Pos-
sible.
This paper has been sent to you
for Luck. The original is in
New England. It has been sent
around the world.
The Luck has been sent to you.
You will receive good luck
within 4 days of receiving this
letter pending in turn you send
it on. This is no joke. You will
receive good luck in the mail.
Send no money. Send copies to
people you think need good
luck. Do not send money cause
faith has no price.
Do not keep this letter. It must
leave your hands within 96 hrs.
An A.R.P. officer Joe Elliot
received $40,000,000.
George Welch lost his wife 5
days after this letter. He failed
to circulate the letter. However
before her death he received
$7,775,000. Please send copies
and see what happens after 4
days.
The chain comes from
Venezula and was written by
Saul Anthony Degnas, a mis-
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South America.
Since the copy must tour the
world, you must make 20 copies
& send them to friends & associ-
ates. After a few days you will
get a surprise.
This is true. Even if not supersti-
tious, do note the following:
Constantine Dais received the
chain in 1963. He asked his sec-
retary to make 20 copies & send
them out. A few days later he
won the lottery of
$62,000,000.00.
Carlos Baddit, an office em-
ployee, received the letter &
forgetting it had to leave his
hands in 96 hours, lost his job.
Delan Fairchild received the
chain & not believing, threw it
away. Nine days later he died. In
1987, the letter was received by
a young woman in California. It
was faded & barely readable.
She promised that she would
retype the letter & send it out,
but she put it aside. She was
plagued with various problems.
The letter did not leave her
hands in 96 hours. She finally
typed the letter as promised and
got a new car.
Saint Jude
Send no money. Do not ignore
this letter. It works.
sionary from S. America.
Since that copy must tour the
World. You must make 20 cop-
ies and send them to friends
and associates after a few days
you will get a surprise.
This is love even if you are not
superstitious. Do note the fol-
lowing: Contonare Dias re-
ceived this letter in 1903. He
asked his Sec'y. to make copies
and send them out. A few days
later he won a lottery of 20
million dollars.
Carl Dobbit, an office em-
ployee received the letter +
forgot it had to leave his hands
within 96 hrs. He lost his job.
After finding the letter again he
made copies and mailed 20 cop-
ies. A few days later he got a
better job.
Dolan Fairchild received the
letter and not believing he
threw it away. 9 days later he
died. In 1987 the letter was
received by a young woman in
Calif. It was faded and hardly
readable. She promised her self
she would retype the letter and
send it on but, she put it aside
to do later. She was plagued
with various problems, includ-
ing expensive car problems.
This letter did not leave her
hands in 96 hrs. She finally
typed the letter as promised and
got a new car. Remember send
no money. Do not ignor this-
it works.
St. Jude
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It is easy to see that some memetic reproduction has occurred here.2
The letters are so similar that it seems highly improbable that they de-
rive from independent sources. This idea has been replicating for many
years, for decades according to the Post Office.29
That some ideas reproduce does not mean that all do. Many ideas
do not have that power. They exist in the mind as mentalese, 30 but they
cannot get out because they do not include a mechanism for translation
into the modes of expression we use for transmission or replication.
Dawkins would probably not call these "memes," as they cannot be
transmitted to a new host. However, given a new environment, a brain
with language up to the task, these ideas might replicate.
Memetic replication requires two possibilities. First, it must be
possible for ideas to be broadcast unintentionally. As evidence that this
is true, consider that Alison broadcast the song in her head without
wanting to do so. Another example of an idea that its holder would not
want to broadcast is the idea that it is effective to use a club to beat on
the head of one's enemies. Clearly, the club inventor would rather
keep his enemies in the dark; he does not want them to get the idea he
has in his head. But the inventor's very use of the club will transmit to
his enemies the idea that they might use a club on him. As a third ex-
ample, consider a fianc6 who wants to negotiate a premarital contract
regarding alimony. This fianc6 does not want to suggest that she lacks
commitment, but by raising the topic, she might communicate that
idea.
Second, memetic reproduction requires that ideas can be received
unintentionally. They can re-form in a new host against his will. This
too is evidenced by the opening example in which Laura becomes in-
fected by a song that she does not want in her head. Songs are excel-
lent examples of this involuntary reception, as is shown by their exten-
sive use in advertising. I did not want the idea in my head that a Chev-
rolet pickup truck is built "Like A Rock" and I certainly did not want
that Bob Seger song, which I once liked, to conjure up visions of Gen-
eral Motors products. But, notwithstanding my desires, that is the re-
sult. I am also not fond of the idea that "White Men Can't Jump."
Nonetheless, it was transmitted to me and it, along with other preju-
28. For a theoretical model of three modes of meme transmission, see Oliver Goodenough,
Information Replication in Culture, Three Modes for the Transmission of Culture Elements
Through Observed Action, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AISB 1999 SYMPOSIUM ON IMITATION IN
ANIMALS AND ARTIFACTS 9-11 (1999) (describing uncoded, partially coded, and fully coded
transmission).
29. See Goodenough, supra note 28.
30. One author uses the word "mentalese" to refer to the nonlanguage in which people
think. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 55-82
(1994).
2001] 1225
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 52:4:1213
dices, sits in my head against my will. Thus both unintentional trans-
mission and unintentional reception are possible. Reproduction can
occur without any human wanting it to. 3'
As ideas are reproduced, they change, there is variation. As the
children's game of "telephone" shows and as false rumors confirm,
ideas, like genes, can mutate by a failure to be copied exactly.32 The
31. Perhaps because memes can reproduce without humans intending them to reproduce,
Dawkins says that "[m]emes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but
technically." DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GAME, supra note 1, at 192. I and perhaps many others
would agree that some ideas are alive. However, I assume for this Article only that some ideas
have the power (though they lack the intention) to replicate against the wishes of humans. We
can discuss the implications for the First Amendment without deciding whether ideas can be
living structures.
32. Being a Property teacher, one of my favorites is the chain of title parable, which I have
seen in various forms. The version read to me as a first year law student is a letter from a law-
yer to his client, a federal agency.
Gentlemen:
I am in receipt of your letter of the fifth of this month inquiring as to the state of
the title prior to the year 1803.
Please be advised that in the year 1803 the United States of America acquired the
Territory of Louisiana from the Republic of France by purchase. The Republic of
France previously acquired title from the Spanish Crown by conquest. Spain ac-
quired title by virtue of the discoveries of one Christopher Columbus, a Genoese
sailor who had been duly authorized to embark upon his voyage of discovery by
Isabella, Queen of Spain. Before granting such authority, Isabella, a pious and
cautious woman, obtained the sanction of His Holiness, the Pope. The Pope is the
Vicar on earth of Jesus Christ, the only son and heir apparent of God. God made
Louisiana.
DUKEMINIER AND KRIER, PROPERTY 693 (3d ed. 1993).
I have received other versions from students over the years. In one, the letter is from a lawyer
seeking a loan from the FHA. It goes as follows:
After sending the information to the FHA, he received the following reply (actual
letter):
Upon review of your letter adjoining your client's loan application, we note that
the request is supported by an Abstract of Title. While we compliment the able
manner in which you have prepared and presented an application, we must point
out that you have only cleared title to the proposed collateral property back to
1803. Before final approval can be accorded, it will be necessary to clear title
back to its origin.
Annoyed, the lawyer responded as follows (actual letter):
Your letter regarding title in Case 189156 has been received. I note that you wish
to have title extended further than the 194 years covered by the present applica-
tion. I was unaware that any educated person in this country, particularly those
working in the property area, would not know that Louisiana was purchased by the
U.S. from France in 1803, the year of origin identified in our application. For the
edification of uninformed FHA bureaucrats, the title to land prior to U.S. owner-
ship was obtained from France, which had acquired it by Right of Conquest from
Spain. The land came into possession of Spain by Right of Discovery made in the
year 1492 by a sea captain named Christopher Columbus, who had been granted
the privilege of seeking a new route to India by then reigning monarch, Isabella.
The good queen, being a pious woman and careful about titles, almost as much as
the FHA, took the precaution of securing the blessing of the Pope before she sold
her jewels to fund Columbus' expedition. Now the Pope, as I'm sure you know, is
the emissary of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. And God, it is commonly accepted,
created this world. Therefore, I believe it is safe to presume that He also made
that part of the world called Louisiana. He, therefore, would be the owner of ori-
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effects of saying something are not always predictable. Words do not
always generate the same idea across listeners. Notice how the two
versions of the Saint Jude letter have evolved in slightly different
ways. Whatever the original name of the guy who lost his wife after
five days, it has now evolved to Cane Walsh in one case and George
Welsh in another. This mutation was probably not intentional, although
we cannot be sure. After losing his wife and sending the letter, he sup-
posedly received some money, either seven thousand or seven million
dollars. This changing of the decimal might also be accidental. Very
often, however, ideas mutate by intentional action. The addition of the
"Send no money" and "Kiss someone you love" phrases were proba-
bly deliberate.
Some religious ideas are especially long lived. We can trace the
Shaker idea back to Mother Ann Lee's split from the Quakers about
1750 and from there back to the Western Catholics and from there
back through the Catholics to Christ. Of course, we could trace many
of the ideas of Christ back to earlier Jews and on back to other relig-
ions. One of the easiest ideas to trace is a legal idea. Citations de-
signed to generate legitimacy also provide a path for researchers to
follow." Much of the study of history is the study of how ideas have
changed through time. According to Mark Twain,
There is no such a thing as a new idea. It is impossible. We
simply take a lot of old ideas and put them into a sort of mental
kaleidoscope. We give them a turn and they make new and cu-
rious combinations. We keep on turning and making new com-
binations indefinitely; but they are the same old pieces of col-
ored glass that have been in use through all the ages.34
III. THE REPLICATION OF "FITTER" IDEAS
So we have the basic elements for Darwinian evolution; ideas re-
produce and there is variation across the reproductions. Some ideas are
more likely to replicate than others; they are fitter ideas. There are
gin. I hope to hell you find His original claim to be satisfactory. Now, may we
have our damn loan? Anonymous.
33. Jeff Lewin has traced the legal phrase "reasonable medical certainty" back to its appar-
ent origin, though he casts some doubt as to whether the phrase has enough content to be called
an idea. See Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty about "Reasonable
Medical Certainty," 57 MD. L. REV. 380, 406 (1998). Michael Fried, a lawyer at the FTC, has
traced a portion of the subsequent history of the procedural rule enunciated in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Michael Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts:
The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 291, 311-13 (Spring 1999). Pat Baude has traced
the evolution of provisions in state constitutions. Patrick Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of
Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions, 28 N.M. L. REV. 343, 344 (1998).
34. MARK MY WORDS: MARK TWAIN ON WRITING 22-23 (Mark Dawidziak ed., 1996).
2001] 1227
Alabama Law Review
many sources of fitness. Some ideas replicate because they make their
holders feel good. One version of the St. Jude letter starts with "Kiss
someone you love." That change was probably a good one from a fit-
ness perspective. It makes the sender feel that the recipient will enjoy
getting the letter and so makes the sender more likely to pass it on (al-
though it was not convincing enough to make my sender provide his
return address on the envelope). It is a warmer and fuzzier idea than
without the change. It would be interesting to see how long the letter
would replicate (if at all) if the starting sentence described something
nasty that made readers feel sick. Perhaps someone has already tried it,
but the idea had no replicative power and was wiped out of the meme
pool.
Other ideas replicate because they are true. The idea that "one plus
two equals two plus one" is true. The idea that the sun revolves around
the earth replicates less than the idea that the earth revolves around the
sun because the former maps reality less well. We value truth. Our
valuing truth may stem from culture, but it might be older and, in a
sense, deeper than that. Valuing truth over falsity could easily have
aided our ancestors to survive. Anyone who mistook a mammoth for a
mate got his genes deleted from the gene pool. Those who accepted
falsity as readily as truth ended up believing that there was a water
hole where there was only sand. Knowing that a mushroom made oth-
ers sick could keep the knower's genes away from harm. Recognizing
that a person is not kin might help one predict whether that person will
cooperate fairly in dividing the kill from a hunt.35 In many ways,
whether a thought is true or false matters to survival or reproduction of
the thinker and, therefore, being able to distinguish truth from false-
hood and having a preference for truthful thoughts are adaptive traits.
In any case, regardless of why, truth matters to many people and ideas
incorporating perceived truths are, all else equal, more likely to repli-
cate.
The idea expressed in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony replicates not
because it is true, but because it is beautiful. It is not clear why music
sounds good, why we have that appetite. One possibility is that the
ability to carry a tune varies with health. Those who could be tuneful
showed that they were good genetic mates in that they were healthy.
Another possibility is that a beautiful voice is like the plumage of a
peacock, attractive to potential mates just because it signals the pres-
ence of genes that will make offspring attractive to mates. In any case,
our valuing tunefulness may be a way to identify good mates. If so, it
35. See generally VERNON REYNOLDS ET AL., THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM:
EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM, AND NATIONALISM
(1986).
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is no wonder that Frank Sinatra and the Beatles were so popular with
women. It is no wonder that Alison and Laura like to sing out loud and
that tunes catch in their heads, and it also may be no wonder that they
are slightly annoyed by hearing each other sing. Since I care about
their well being, maybe there should be little mystery about why their
beautiful singing is so deeply comforting to me.
Although Mark Twain was correct that ideas evolve, he was wrong
to say that none are new. Some ideas are new and indeed replicate be-
cause they are new. We like to hear and think new things. Perhaps we
are naturally curious because being curious helped our ancestors find
new sources of food.36 Some ideas reproduce because they are comical.
Jokes are my favorite meme-complexes.
Ideas might also replicate because they are happy thoughts. If an
idea includes, as a component, the meme that children who are believ-
ers (or are well behaved) will get rewards such as books and toys,
children capable of living up to those standards will be eager to en-
dorse the idea. And if another component of the idea is that loved ones
who die remain alive in a happier place, that comforting thought will
improve the chances that the children will retain the idea as they grow
beyond receiving toys.
The ideas above replicate because they make people feel good.
Other ideas replicate because they help people in more physical ways.
The idea of a round wheel is better than the idea of a square wheel,
and the idea of a wagon is for some purposes better than the idea of a
sled. The idea of hitting an enemy with a club is better for the hitter
than the idea of hitting him with a hand. Thus, in many ways the qual-
ity of the idea influences its rate of replication. This aspect of fitness is
well recognized, indeed stressed, by the marketplace metaphor.
Jokes are not as funny after we know the punch line, so it might
not humor us much to pass them on. And your enjoyment of Beethoven
might not do me any good. But we transmit meme-complexes for other
reasons, thinking they will be new or funny, beautiful or useful, to the
next person. One reason is that we want to make others feel like we
felt on first hearing. We care about how others feel.
I might also pass an idea to you because your adoption of the idea
will serve my interests directly. If I can convince you to believe the
idea that I am your friend, you might do me a favor in the future. If I
can convince voters not to impose high taxes on me, I will have more
money to spend. If I can convince the city council that densely parked
cars are dangerous to children, the council might prevent those who do
36. Maybe we prize "new" ideas in part because their newness suggests that they are the
products of our will, rather than the products of brains enslaved by existing ideas.
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not live in my neighborhood from parking in front of my house. I
might attempt to propagate the idea in this Article because Indiana
University will reward me for doing so. Researchers hoping to find
ways to keep radioactive wastes isolated might be rewarded for finding
a way to keep alive in practical perpetuity the idea that certain storage
sites should never be opened.
Non-financial rewards also might accompany my writing. I could
get special recognition and status if you read this Article and like it
enough to recommend it to your friends. As another example, consider
that my pay as a lawyer might depend on my ability to communicate an
idea to a judge or client; in such cases, I am paid to pass along some-
one else's idea. Finally, some ideas without any intrinsic merit repro-
duce because they serve as a signal to others that the source is a mem-
ber of an inside group. Like a secret handshake, the invocation of cer-
tain ideas says that the speaker is one who can be trusted or deserves
cooperation.37 There are many ways in which people may benefit from
communicating ideas. Being the vehicle of reproduction for an idea
may bring rewards even if the idea is not inherently valuable.
Another way an idea can improve its chances for reproduction is to
improve the chances of survival or reproduction of its holders. A reli-
gious idea containing the maxim not to eat pork serves its holders well
if many available pork products harbor trichinosis. A commandment to
be fruitful and multiply could result in a greater number of offspring
for the holders of the credo embracing that precept. Successful human
reproduction and successful idea replication flow from each other.
Compare that idea, "be fruitful and multiply," to the correspond-
ing idea held by the Shakers or, more accurately, the United Society of
Believers in Christ's Second Appearing. In a moment of rapture that
was to lead to generations of frustration, Mother Ann Lee envisioned
that Adam and Eve had been hurled out of Eden not for eating fruit,
but for having sex. Her vision also told her that she was to lead the
Earth out of sin and from that time forward she promoted the idea that
sexual union was an indecent, sinful act. By living apart and avoiding
the sin of sex, men and women could leave the life of this world and
enter the millennial kingdom. The amazing thing about this avoid-sex-
enter-kingdom meme is that it managed to survive as long as it has. It
is not, however, an unqualified success. There are only about eight
Shakers left. Some ideas reproduce poorly because they are bad for
their holders, or bad for the reproduction of their holders. We are re-
minded of this sad truth every time a cult wipes out its central meme in
a mass suicide.
37. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 124-41 (1984).
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Of course, just as religious ideas need not be successful, success-
fully adapted ideas need not be religious. Other complicated norms
evolve too. In some fascinating experiments initiated by Robert Ax-
elrod, researchers have found that a certain spirit of limited coopera-
tion may be a good strategy.38 These experiments model life as a series
of prisoner's dilemma games.39 The "prisoner's dilemma" takes its
name from the following type of scenario.'" Bonnie and Clyde are
prisoners in jail awaiting trial for a crime they committed together.
The prosecutor tells each, "If you testify against your accomplice, I
will give you a one-year better deal than if you do not testify." If nei-
ther rats on the other, they each get two years in jail. If they both rat
(defect), they each get three years. If just one rats, the rat gets one
year and the sucker gets four years. Put more generally, the defini-
tional requirements for a two-person prisoner's dilemma are (1) each
player is better off if she defects than if she is loyal, regardless of the
behavior of the other, and (2) it is better for each player if both coop-
erate continuously than if they take turns defecting.4 A player receives
the greatest payoff if she can convince the other to be loyal to her
while defecting herself. The prisoner's dilemma serves as a nice model
for some situations in life in which "the pursuit of self-interest by each
leads to a poor outcome for all."'42
Axelrod, a political scientist, set up a computer tournament involv-
ing a number of different players facing each other in repeated pris-
oner's dilemmas.43 He solicited game-playing strategies from other
academicians and let those strategies fight it out in iterated prisoner's
dilemmas to see which strategy yielded the best outcomes for the play-
ers in the long run. He shows easily that there is no single best strat-
egy; which strategy succeeds depends on the environment, including
the strategies of the other players. Which strategy wins also depends
on the discount rate they value of future outcomes relative to past out-
comes.44
Axelrod received sixty-two strategies submitted from six countries.
The strategy that did the best overall in his game is called "tit-for-
tat."'45 A player following this strategy initially is loyal to the other
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 10. The phrase "both cooperate" sounds redundant, but Axelrod and others call
one player's loyal behavior "cooperation" even when the other player defects.
42. AXELROD, supra note 37, at 7.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 15.
45. See generally Robert Axelrod & William Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
SCIENCE 1390-96 (1981); see also DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GAME, supra note 1, ch.12;
WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: JOHN VON NEUMANN, GAME THEORY, AND THE
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player. After that friendly start, the player becomes a "copycat," do-
ing what the other player did on the preceding play, defect or not. This
strategy is essentially embodied in the maxims "do unto others as you
would have them do unto you" for the initial encounter, "an eye for an
eye,"-46 for retaliating in subsequent repetitions for defections by the
other player, and "forgive and forget" so that cooperation can be es-
tablished after a defection and retaliation.
The conditions in Axelrod's experiment are not very constrictive.
He does not assume that payoffs for the two players are made in some
common currency or measurable on some absolute scale, that payoffs
are symmetrical, that cooperation is desirable for anyone but the play-
ers, or that the players are rational or have foresight or are even con-
scious of applying a strategy 7.4  However, for cooperation to evolve,
the players must be able to recognize what the other player did and
there must be a high probability of future interaction. Cooperation is
not likely to occur where there is no possibility of future cooperation
or retaliation because defection is the superior strategy in those cir-
cumstances.48 Although there is debate about how often Axelrod's
conditions obtain, Axelrod offers a number of examples: cooperation
(or not) between nations considering whether to erect trade barriers;
non-cooperation between nations continuing the arms race; and
interactions between members of the United States Senate.4 1 If, in
prehistory, enough important real-life situations resembled a prisoner's
dilemma and if the competing strategies resembled the strategies used
in Axelrod's competition, we might expect people following the tit-for-
PUZZLE OF THE BOMB (1992); Martin Nowak & Karl Signumd, A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose
Shift That Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 364 NATURE 56-58 (1993)
(reporting a strategy that sounds to me like, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"); MATT RIDLEY,
THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 79-80 (1998) (describing a couple of other winning strategies, Pavlov
and Firm-but-Fair); Philip Kitcher, The Evolution of Human Altruism, 90 J. PHIL. 497-516
(1993) (showing conditions under which discriminating altruists and people who "forgive and
forget" can flourish and showing how holders of different philosophies might beneficially seg-
regate themselves and cooperate with their own type); Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The
Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation, 91 AM. POL. So. REV. 290 (1997). "Tit-for-tat" derives
from "tip for tap," in which "tip" means "light touch," as in a "foul tip." MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1216 (9th ed. 1981).
46. AXELROD, supra note 37, at 136-37.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 4-5, 16. He uses the example of Senators in the United States Congress as players
in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, noting how cooperation has evolved among them despite there
being no formal rules or central authority governing much of their behavior. It is interesting to
note that term limits would be quite detrimental to cooperation between members of Congress.
Once Senator A knows there can be no further interactions, he knows he should defect. But if he
knows that, usually, so does Senator B, who knows that he should defect one step before A does
because A will defect on the last interaction. But A knows B knows that, so A should defect on
the third to last interaction. Thus the threads of cooperation unravel. Id. at 10. It is not clear
that their cooperation is beneficial to the nation, but, if it is, term limits would appear to be a
bad idea.
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elrod's competition, we might expect people following the tit-for-tat
strategy to have starved less often than people following other strate-
gies. If the tit-for-tat idea helps its holders to survive by generating a
spirit of reciprocal cooperation which allows gains from trades where
there is no effective political apparatus to enforce contracts, we might
expect that it will be passed along and the idea itself will show a strong
ability to survive through replication. Axelrod's experiment suggests
why revenge might be so common in social norms; societies that es-
pouse it have survived. 0
Axelrod identifies four properties which tend to make a decision-
rule successful in his experiments: "avoidance of unnecessary conflict
by cooperating as long as the other player does, provocability in the
face of an uncalled for defection by the other, forgiveness after re-
sponding to a provocation, and clarity of behavior so that the other
player can adapt to your pattern of action."'" Based on his experi-
ments, he offers four simple suggestions for individuals: "do not be
envious of the other player's success; do not be the first to defect; re-
ciprocate both cooperation and defection; and do not be too clever. ,52
It is clear that any or all of these properties might be incorporated into
a religion, philosophy, maxim, or some other meme-complex. And if
he is right that these ideas help their carriers, they have a good chance
of being passed along to other human vehicles. As a particularly com-
pelling example, he relates the story of how cooperation (a cease-fire)
broke out between soldiers in hostile trenches during World War .53
Clearly it is possible that the memes leading to this particular instance
of cooperation survived at least for a while by being able to keep their
carriers alive.
Shifting from the individual to the Olympian perspective, Axelrod
offers advice as to how a society can foster cooperation. 4 One of the
primary ways is to increase the shadow of the future, which includes
making relationships more durable and interactions more frequent. 5
Other ways are to teach people to reciprocate, to care about each
other, and to recognize those with whom they are dealing. 6 If coopera-
tion between members of a society can make them healthier, and that
can enhance the health of the nation, then nations with rules or norms
that foster cooperation might be better able to protect their populations
50. See AXELROD, supra note 37, at 10.
51. See id. at 20.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 124.
55. AXELROD, supra note 37, at 126, 129.
56. Id. at 134-39.
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of both memes and genes from hostile attack.5"
The fitness of an idea depends on its environment. Truths would
not replicate as well if there were no organisms that valued truth or
benefitted from knowing truth. Beautiful and humorous ideas require
somebody to appreciate them. Newness requires inexperience. Replica-
tive quality also depends on the environment surrounding the potential
carriers. The wagon idea is worse than the sled idea at the North pole.
The idea of bearskin coats keeping Eskimos warm is high in quality
when it occurs in the head of an Eskimo, but low in quality (except as
a warning) in the head of a bear. Considering ideas that have replicated
into the present, people have been the primary environment in which
ideas are fit or not. Animals may have had lots of ideas, and may have
communicated some of those ideas, but their apparent lack of means
for recording any ideas or communicating complicated ideas has pre-
vented animal brains from being environments in which complicated,
non-instinctive ideas can survive for long. Whether an idea will sur-
vive and replicate depends in large part on its quality as perceived by
us. Ideas that people consider to be good ideas will be more likely to
stand the test of time.
I would like to distinguish environment from context, although they
often merge together. Memes, like genes, have a way of banding to-
gether into larger, more complicated, meme-complexes.58 The meme
that it is good to have lots of children appears in a number of different
religions or philosophies. The effectiveness of the nurture-children
meme depends not only on the human environment in which it is found
(and that human's surroundings), but also on the greater idea within
which it is embedded. If it is a part of a meme-complex that says it is
good to have children because it is good to have fun, it will not carry
far in people for whom having and rearing children is not all that much
fun. If the meme is part of a religion that says it is good to have chil-
dren because God says it will improve your chances of getting to
heaven, the meme may be effective even in people for whom rearing
children is painful.
Thus, fitness depends on a number of qualities that may be pos-
sessed by ideas, along with the context and environment within which
the idea lives. Those aspects of fitness fit within the marketplace meta-
phor. For the sorts of ideas exemplified so far, the marketplace-of-
ideas metaphor seems apt enough. People select the ideas they want to
promote from among the many available, much as they select consumer
products, with the broad interests (including other-regarding prefer-
57. For additional discussion of the evolution of cooperation and argument that cooperation
cannot evolve as a group trait, see generally MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE (1998).
58. See DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE, supra note 1, at 197.
[Vol. 52:4:12131234
Memetic Approach to the First Amendment
ences) of the selecting person serving as the basis for choice.
A. Aggressive Ideas
Attractiveness to people is not the only factor important to the rep-
licating life of an idea. Fitness depends also on the aggressiveness of
the idea itself. None of the examples above involves an idea that plays
an active part in its own reproduction. Yet some ideas do seem to en-
courage or discourage their own reproduction. A simile might clarify
the point. Ideas are like chemical compounds. Most ideas are like steel
or plastic in that we choose whether to harvest and create them. But
some ideas are like DNA in that they have an ability to affect their own
rate of production. If we create new DNA, it might continue recreating
itself despite our wishing it would stop. A small subset of ideas act like
that, aggressively marshalling resources for their replication. For these
special ideas, the marketplace metaphor does not tell the whole story.
Their production is influenced by their interests in addition to our
needs.
Some aggressive ideas masquerade as members of the group of
ideas that are helpful to their holders. The Saint Jude letter says that
the sender will be rewarded in cash, up to sixty-two million dollars
according to one letter, if it is reproduced in time. 9 (It also promises
catastrophe to those who fail to aid in its replication.) As a result, that
letter tends to replicate more readily than would one that says, "You
will meet financial ruin if you send a copy of this to anyone. "6 Vari-
ous religions combine claims to truth and beauty with promises of re-
ward to adherents and promises of punishment to nonbelievers. Often,
however, both the accrued rewards and punishments are not payable
until after death. This makes it hard for us to check on the veracity of
the claims. The Saint Jude letter employs a similar tactic in saying that
the letter has to be sent within four days. In theory, a recipient could
check on the truth of the claims in the letter; but there is not enough
time to do so. It is easier just to send it on. I do not mean to imply that
the adapted idea must be as simple as a chain letter or that the claims
of benefits for holders are always false or untestable. Education claims
benefits for holders and sometimes delivers.
Thus, DNA-like ideas, these memes or collections of memes, rec-
ommend or promote themselves. 6' A philosophy may hold, self-
reflectively, that it contains the key to truth and that the truth should be
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
60. Id.
61. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE, supra note 1, at 192-95.
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spread far and wide. 62 If the idea catches on, it generates its own en-
thusiasm for transmission.63 Other ideas promote their propagation
without claiming to be the sort of idea that should be heard and held by
all. 6 Some ideas reproduce because they "push our buttons." Creative
writers aim advertising at these mental buttons. The brain has an
Achilles heel that advertisers try to exploit. In a nice bit of self-
protective, pre-emptive commentary, a Budweiser ad repeated, "Why
ask Why? Drink Bud Dry." This meme combination not only caught in
my brain, it discouraged any rational interrogation of its own message.
Advertisers aim to create meme complexes that will both play over and
over in our heads and be communicated to others. They spend fortunes
to make ideas catchy. They try to send out replicating memes for
which they can charge us later, one way or another. 65 Likewise with
political slogans. Careers are built on the ability to make ideas, includ-
ing bad ones, into replicating memes. It is not easy to see why our
brains remember things that are false or useless. The mind evolved for
some reason to be as it is, but now it can be redeployed to other tasks,
like remembering (or should I say rememebering) catchy jingles.
If one idea is easier to remember than others, then it has a greater
chance of replication. It is hard to transmit what you cannot recall. The
Shaker idea may be in trouble in part because the founders chose a
name for the religion that is too hard to remember: The United Society
of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing. The name of the meme-
complex-its handle-matters.
Similarly, ideas that are more easily detected are more easily trans-
mitted. Because tongues and ears are not perfect transducers, some
ideas have better chances of long term survival because they are easier
to say or hear. Dawkins gives the example of two phrases competing
for replication by English singers: "Hail Britannia, Britannia rule the
waves" 66 and "Hail Britannia, Britannia rules the waves." The former
is the original, but the latter is displacing it. 67 Dawkins suggests that
the version with an "s" has an evolutionary advantage.68 Because the
"s" makes a clear and distinctive sound, a few voices are enough to
make it sound like everyone is singing an "s" on "rules.- 69 It only
takes a few persons singing the wrong version, the invading meme, for
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Note, in this connection, the recent successful attempts to extend copyright protection
further into the future.
66. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE, supra note 1, at 324.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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all of those present who are ignorant to learn the mutation instead of
the original. Those who do not know that "rule" is not supposed to
have an "s" at the end will learn to sing the "s."' Not only is it easier
to hear the "s" than to hear its absence," it may be more comforting
to think that Britannia does rule than to think that Britannia needs to be
told to go out and rule.7 '
Ideas can also foster their transmission by making their holders
more able to transmit ideas. The idea that education is good leads its
holders to get more education, which in turn gives them a greater abil-
ity to argue convincingly that education is good. The idea that priests
should be celibate increases their time available for proselytizing.
Similarly, ideas can aggressively influence their replication by increas-
ing the number of minds exposed to the idea. Many belief systems in-
struct their holders to spread the word, just as the rabies gene instructs
its carrier to pass it along by biting or an influenza virus instructs its
carrier to spread the gene in a sneeze.
B. Resources Are Limited, Even in the Idea World
Ideas cannot exist in a vacuum; ideas need sustaining resources.
They need a place to replicate, media within which to live. Such media
include books, computers, videotapes, compact discs, and brains, none
of which is infinite. For purposes of this Article, there are two impor-
tant limitations. First, brains are not large enough to hold all possible
ideas.72 Second, people are not entirely comfortable holding or com-
municating contradictory ideas. We cannot accept that a meaningful
sentence and its opposite are both true. If we value the truth, we will
not value, or replicate, opposing sentences equally. Hence, if there are
inconsistent ideas in our head, one may replicate and survive while the
other does not. In one way of thinking, this is the point for which
Thomas Kuhn is often cited. Kuhn recognized that scientific meme-
complexes can sometimes be dislodged only by other competing meme-
complexes. 3
Not only do inconsistent ideas sometimes have difficulty coexisting
in the same head, they might have difficulty coexisting in the same
culture. Suppose one idea, call it kamikaze anthropocentrism, includes
as components the memes that human beings are the highest form of
life and that what makes them the highest form of life is their eager-
70. Id.
71. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE, supra note 1, at 324.
72. John von Neumann said that mathematical knowledge had grown to the point that a hu-
man brain could be familiar with only one fourth of it. POUNDSTONE, supra note 45, at 33.
73. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (1962).
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ness to sacrifice their lives to proclaim their ideas. Suppose that an-
other idea, call it kamikaze anti-anthropocentrism, contains as compo-
nents the propositions that anyone who believes that humans are the
highest form of life is evil and that such persons should be put to
death, and that any true believer should and will risk her life to imple-
ment this idea. These two ideas are not likely to exist, unmodified, for
long in the same human environment. Holders of the ideas will kill
each other until only one of the ideas survives. We can be reasonably
confident that these two ideas cannot coexist, even absent knowledge
of how many people "like" either of the ideas. There is a difference, I
admit, between thought and action. People may believe in an idea that
says that all true believers will kill for the idea and still not kill for the
idea. Practically speaking, however, it is unlikely that two such in-
compatible ideas will last long in the same environment.74
As noted above, ideas can mutate by intentional action. Intentional
modification has been a fact of life for memes much longer than for
genes. When holders of antagonistic ideas live near each other, a
holder of one idea can modify it by deleting some component part to
make the ideas more compatible. If there are a few kamikaze anthropo-
centrists in an environment made up mostly of kamikaze anti-
anthropocentrists, we would expect some of the few to modify their
belief, perhaps by making it unimportant whether holders are willing to
speak and die for their beliefs. Changing the idea to include a tenet that
belief in the anthropocentrist idea may properly be held in secret may
help both the holders and the idea itself to survive. The idea survives
by going underground. On the other hand, if the kamikaze anti-
anthropocentrists are in the minority and there is an effective state sys-
tem of execution for murder, kamikaze anti-anthropocentrists might
modify their system of beliefs by deleting the provision that believers
should kill nonbelievers. Holders, therefore could maintain their ideo-
logical purity without killing anthropocentrists for their beliefs. Thus,
the strengthening of the state and the enforcement of criminal law may
have contributed to the softening of religious ideas that called for death
to heretics.75 That ideas can mutate by accident or intentional modifica-
tion to allow coexistence does not, however, deny the proposition that
some ideas cannot coexist. In the examples just given, one of the origi-
nal ideas no longer exists in its original form.
It is dangerous to an idea for its holder to adopt an inconsistent
74. In a somewhat related vein, "no two species eating the identical foods in identical ways
can coexist peaceably in the same test tubes, on the same rocks, or on the same islands without
one species driving the other to extinction." JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH, A
STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME 55 (1994).
75. At the same time, they may have increased the opportunities for killing those who op-
posed the state.
1238 [Vol. 52:4:1213
Memetic Approach to the First Amendment
idea because the inconsistency might be resolved in favor of the new
idea. In this world of limited resources, ideas can increase their sur-
vival by isolating holders from opposing ideas. The religious idea em-
braced by some of the Amish tells its holders to avoid the influences of
television and other media that might transmit competing memes. Ideas
opposing biological evolution have taken a similar approach. In De-
cember of 1927, a religiously fundamentalist high school teacher in
Tennessee was fired for having mentioned "evolution" in school. 6
One parent supporting that termination told the principal that he didn't
know what "evolution" meant and didn't want his children to know
either.' Thus, the anti-evolution meme assures access to the resources
it needs to continue replicating-ignorant minds.
C. Dangerous Memes
We now turn to a deeply troubling type of memetic fitness, a sort
of fitness that gives this paper a reason for being. Some ideas assure
access to necessary resources by wiping out or neutralizing carriers of
opposing ideas. The simplest example is the idea that holders of oppos-
ing doctrine should be assassinated. Sentences like, "Those who kill
the heretics are heroes," disable the opposition in two ways. First,
they cause the death of holders of heretical ideas which might compete
for resources. Of course, killing a human host cannot directly propa-
gate the killer meme-complex because the potential host is dead. But
death does prevent that host from sewing the competing meme-complex
in other unclaimed furrows. Thus, the kill-the-heretics idea assures
access to resources that would have been gobbled up by competing
memes.
Established meme-complexes impede the spread of many other
meme-complexes, not just those that are directly contrary. Stalin and
Mao accurately recognized that religious beliefs could make it more
difficult for communism to catch on. Their virulent strain of commu-
nism preserved fertile fields for itself by ruthlessly eliminating those
who voiced competing meme-complexes. This killing of heretics is a
form of rent-seeking by memes.78 Memes waste human resources in
their attempts to prevent other memes from being the first to capture
unclaimed resources.
In addition to reducing the sources of opposing ideas, the heroes-
76. Marjorie Garber, Cinema Scopes: Evolution, Media, and the Law, in LAW IN THE
DOMAINS OF CULTURE 131 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
77. Id.
78. "Rent seeking" refers to the socially costly pursuit of existing resources. See 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 315 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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kill-heretics idea makes it less likely opposition hosts will communicate
their views to new hosts. Again, shutting off the communication, and
hence replication, of competing memes does not directly advance the
replication of the killer meme-complex. But decreased reproduction of
competitors leaves more resources for the killer.
St. Augustine said that forcing religious dogma on heretics was
justified not on the ground that their ideas were dangerous to the idea
of Christianity, but on the ground that the heretics deserved and needed
to be saved from eternal damnation.79 Of course, building that rationale
into the Christian meme-complex's treatment of heretics makes the
Christian meme-complex much more robust (partly by being more
Christian). The kill-the-heretics idea is much more appealing, much
more fit, if it says that its treatment of heretics is for their benefit, not
for its own preservation
An idea might go one step further and replicate not just by harming
those who oppose it but by advocating the killing of persons who
merely fail to espouse it. "Kill all those who will not pledge their alle-
giance to our Fuihrer." When one person expresses such an idea, oth-
ers will fear that their failure to make a similar proclamation will lead
to death. Their pledges of fidelity to the idea will, in turn, create a fear
in others. Each proclamation includes protection for the proclaimer and
creates an incentive for others to jump on the bandwagon. The band-
wagon effect can result in runaway memes. For a recent example of a
meme that reduces the opposition by urging death to non-believers,
consider the death sentence decreed on Salman Rushdie by the Ayatol-
lah. That edict, which has now been lifted, said, in effect: "All per-
sons criticizing the Ayatollah should be put to death." So far, it has
not terminated Rushdie, but other critics of the Ayatollah may have
lost their lives or been silenced.
To sum up, because of differences in relative adaptivity to a selec-
tive environment, some memes will flourish while others vanish. We
idea-holders are, of course, a key part of that environment. But we are
not the only part. The environment also includes the ideas themselves.
Some methods memes use to gain an advantage cause harm to persons.
Genocide is the extermination of genes by killing their carrier vehicles.
Similarly, memocide is the extermination of memes by killing their
carrier vehicles. A memocidal meme is an idea that works to kill off
another meme by killing the carrier, that is to say, by killing us.
79. See generally ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS (Henry Chadwick trans., 1998)
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D. The Necessity of Humans
At present here on earth, complex non-instinctive ideas cannot rep-
licate for long without us. They depend on us and we know it. But we
ought not be complacent. In the future, ideas may find a way of repro-
ducing indefinitely on their own. More important, even if self-
replication is not possible, we cannot count on ideas to act like they
depend on us any more than mice on the tundra can count on arctic
foxes to act like they know that foxes might not survive if they wipe
out the mouse population. Driven by the same instincts that have kept
their genes in the pool thus far, some foxes will pursue the mice with
all the more persistence as the mice approach extinction. We know
ideas depend on us, but the ideas do not know that.
IV. THAT'S No ORDINARY MARKET8 °
Implications are becoming obvious. Ideas use people as vehicles
for their replication and have differing abilities to survive and repro-
duce in their human environment. Some ideas work to eliminate other
competing ideas, in the worst cases by calling for the elimination of the
vehicles carrying the opposition. People suffer collateral damage in the
battles between ideas. The universe of ideas is not simply a market-
place from which people choose the ones that suit human purposes.
Ideas do not have to be sensible or beneficial or beautiful to thrive;
they need only be effective. People are not in total control of relative
populations of ideas. Our limited control becomes even more limited
when we adopt rules, such as those preserving free speech, that pre-
vent us from intervening in the fight among ideas. We have a choice
between allowing a mostly "natural" selection of ideas and allowing
purposeful, human selection of ideas. We are the creators of most
ideas on earth today. Having so created, ought we to sit back and let
ideas fight or ought we to intervene deliberately, favoring some ideas
over others?
Legal rules, like other ideas, evolve. Rulings replicate (as judges
decide similar issues in similar ways); the copies can and do vary; and
successor judges select which copies will replicate yet again. Scholars
have debated whether the common law decision-making process causes
rules to evolve toward efficiency."1 One implication of the evolutionary
80. The allusion here is to MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Columbia/TriStar Stu-
dios 1975). The search party comes across a rabbit. After it rips apart one of the party, another
comments, "that's no ordinary rabbit." This market of ideas can be equally ferocious.
81. See generally Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
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approach to ideas is that legal ideas, rules, would have to be amazingly
special indeed for us to think that they would evolve in a way that
would be good for people. I have argued that in some limited contexts,
rules might evolve toward efficiency, 2 but the analysis here gives me
pause. As we saw above, ideas can catch on and replicate for reasons
that are wholly independent of their utility to people.
The "best interests of the child" standard, invoked by judges de-
ciding child custody battles, is one example of a legal idea that might
not evolve toward efficiency. For one thing, it is not clear that the
standard is applied honestly by judges deciding cases.83 More impor-
tant, it is clear that the interests of the child are at least partially exter-
nal not only to the judge, but to the parents disputing custody. So it is
not clear that there is an adequate avenue through which the superior
efficiency of one outcome or the other would make itself heard. And of
even more significance, it is possible that the "best interests" jingle
could be repeated because judges think it makes them look good in the
eyes of those who keep them in power even though it is not in the
"best interests" of society.
V. GROUNDS FOR OUR INTERVENTION IN MEME SELECTION
There are a number of possible grounds for intervening in the evo-
lution of ideas. One such ground is to assure fair play in the competi-
tion of ideas just as we assure fair play between our children. We
might decide that it is fair for an idea to assert that another idea is
wrong, but unfair for an idea to urge that the competing idea be elimi-
nated from discourse. Fairness requires that each idea be given a
chance to survive. This approach runs into a self-referential problem,
however, because any law prohibiting expression of an idea that urges
death to other ideas is itself an idea that leads to the death of such ag-
gressive ideas. Implementation of the position that it is fair for an idea
to attack another idea but it is unfair for an idea to attack the holder of
the idea runs into the same problem.
A. Intervention for the Sake of Ideas
It may be good for ideas for them to be given blanket protection
from legislation, leaving it up to ideas to battle it out. On the other
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary
Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985).
82. Jeffrey Stake, Status and Incentive Effects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447,
1450-51 (1991).
83. Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 J. FAM. L. 325, 337-43 (1996-
97).
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hand, allowing ideas a free hand in determining their own replication is
not necessarily good, even for them. Memetic diversity may be as im-
portant for ideas as genetic diversity is for genes.8 4 The population of
ideas could be healthier if it contains many different memes. It be-
comes harder to defend the position that we should let any and all ideas
exist once we know that it is impossible for all ideas to coexist in one
environment and that some ideas will work to kill off others. By stop-
ping the replication of some ideas, we may be able to preserve many
more from extinction.85 Herbert Spencer proclaimed that survival of
the fittest was not just nature's way, it ought to be our way. That fal-
lacy, of drawing "ought" from "is," is just as morally wrong for
memes as it is for genes.
Hence, another potential ground for intervention is our interest in a
diversity of ideas. Suppose for example, that idea A is incompatible
with B, C, D, and E, while idea B is incompatible with only A. Elimi-
nating A will allow for a greater number of differing ideas than would
eliminating B. However, implementing this approach would be imprac-
tical, if not impossible. Ideas are too hard to define. An idea could be
broken up into multiple ideas, which would then increase the count on
one side of the balance.
B. Intervention for the Sake of Humans
As shown above, even if it were good for ideas to protect them
from legislation, such protection might not be good for people. Once
we know that we are important, albeit often unwitting, vessels of their
transmission, it seems less sensible to say that we should stay out of
the fray of competing ideas. It becomes a curious idea indeed that ideas
can kill us but we cannot fight back.
Looking out for our interests is fundamentally different from look-
ing out for the interests of ideas. Looking out for our interests requires
deciding which ideas are valuable to people, expressly allowing human
values to play a part in the decisions. What might a human-oriented
free-speech policy look like? First, it would recognize that ideas can
cause injury and death. To a limited extent, current First Amendment
doctrine already recognizes this by allowing states to outlaw shouting
84. On the importance of genetic diversity to people, see generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 37-55
(1987), PAUL EHRLICH, THE LOSS OF DIVERSITY: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, IN
BIODIVERSITY 21 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988), and EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE
(1992).
85. Cf. Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 206
(1974) (relating preservation of nature to preservation of ideas).
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"fire" in a crowded theater. 86 However, current doctrine protects other
speech that can lead to injury or death as long as the causation is not
imminent.87 Such dangerous ideas might fare well in a contest with
other ideas, but we humans might thrive in an environment that ex-
cludes them. There is no particular reason to believe that the fittest
ideas are those most useful for our survival and happiness. A human-
oriented free-speech policy might also recognize a distinction between,
on the one hand, ideas that cause the death of their holders (which may
be bound for extinction) or ideas that have little effect on their holders
(which can be chosen according to their attractiveness) and, on the
other hand, ideas that cause the death of people who do not embrace
the idea. The latter pose a larger threat of replication to the detriment
of people.
Second, even when our interests are paramount, even when they
are the sole consideration, we might care about preserving a wide ar-
ray of ideas. Great ideas are tributes to the human mind. 8  It is likely
that people will benefit in the future by preserving memetic diversity
today. Because we have little awareness of which ideas will be impor-
tant to our future welfare, it could serve us well to preserve a broad
diversity of ideas. Thus, a human-oriented protection of free speech
might allow states to constrain the reproduction of ideas that have spe-
cial ability to eliminate other ideas from the meme pool, an ability that
derives not from proving the others wrong but from discouraging their
reproduction regardless of their truth.
C. Civil Liberty Values
One way to approach the First Amendment is by focusing on the
romantic ideal self realization through self expression. 9 Can a position
that allows suppression of some speech be reconciled with a strong
belief in the protection of speech? In other words, is the ACLU going
to allow me to continue my membership? I hope so. Although the First
Amendment constrains governments, the assumption underlying that
Amendment is that it is good for people to be able to speak freely. The
government causes great harm when people fear imprisonment for their
speech. The same harm arises, however, when a person fears death
86. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
87. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
88. "It is true that Fourier had the opinion that the principal aim of mathematics was
public utility and explanation of natural phenomena; but a philosopher like him should have
known that the sole end of science is the honor of the human mind, and that under this title
a question about numbers is worth as much as a question about the system of the world."
CARL JACOBI, MATHEMATICAL MAXIMS AND MINIMS (N. Rose ed., 1988).
89. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND
ROMANCE (1990).
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from vigilantes for speaking out. Thus, a person in favor of truly free
speech ought to be willing to consider applying the power of govern-
ment to protect free speech from those who would constrain it by ad-
vocating harm to speakers. If we really care about freedom of speech,
we should attend to the reality that speech can, in a meaningful way,
interfere with freedom of speech. In this market, some products push
the others off the shelves. Even if freedom of speech is our only goal,
therefore, we might wish to allow suppression of certain ideas. 90 Tho-
mas Jefferson said, "I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hos-
tility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."t Govern-
mental hostility to tyrannical memes can be consistent with that senti-
ment.
VI. A PROPOSED RULE
Assuming we should intervene, how and when to intervene are
difficult questions, of course. As noted above, allowing governmental
intervention permits those holding political power to advance their own
interests rather than societal interests unless the standards limiting in-
tervention are determinate. Indeed, it seems that the difficulty of spell-
ing out clear rules as to how and when idea replication can be limited
by law has, in the past, been the primary argument for the conclusion
that we ought not intervene. We need a firm railing to protect us from
sliding if we are to traverse this slippery slope.
To start with, a people-first approach could incorporate much of
the current First Amendment doctrine. Shouting "fire" in a crowded
theater would remain unprotected. The key difference would arise in
the area of political speech which, being necessary to democracy, lies
at the heart of the constitutional protection. The goal identified by Dar-
winian analysis is to prevent memes from using advocacy of harm to
human vehicles as a tactic to compete with other ideas. One example,
discussed above, is the speech "death to the critics of X," where X
stands for some idea. We could adopt an interpretation of the First
Amendment that permits a law such as "It shall be a crime to say
'Death to the critics of X."' But allowing states to pass such a law
goes too far. I could be put in jail for publishing this Article, which is
surely not a just or efficient result. We need to distinguish between
advocacy and discussion.
Consider a statute that says "It shall be a crime to advocate physi-
90. Anyhow, I hope this argument is good enough to keep the ACLU from revoking my
membership.
91. From Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), in FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 344
(Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
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cal harm to a person based on her speech." This prohibition goes to
the heart of the problem, attempting to corral those memes that fight
by attacking the holders of competing ideas. However, it still might be
a bit too broad. It could be argued that proponents of this law could
themselves be jailed for advocating harm to those who express certain
ideas. We need to further narrow the range of prohibitions permitted
by the First Amendment by making it clear that "physical harm," for
these purposes, does not include jail. The First Amendment should be
amended or construed so that:
Governments may punish a speaker who advocates or threatens
physical injury (other than punishment by the state) to the per-
son or possessions of those who promote, oppose, or fail to es-
pouse a certain idea.9'
By this interpretation, states could be intolerant of intolerance.
A. The Worst Memes
We have seen that some memes are worse than others. Ideas that
do not fight for their own survival and reproduction are not especially
dangerous. We can pick them off the shelf for our use when we need
them and, more important, put them back on the shelf when they are
unhelpful. Because we care about human happiness, ideas that fight by
jeopardizing human health or survival are worse than ideas that fight
by increasing human happiness or health. Because we care about the
health of the meme pool, memes that endanger both humans and other
memes are worse than memes that similarly endanger humans but do
not endanger memes. The most dangerous memes combine two attrib-
utes: they fight for survival by silencing and reducing populations of
competing memes rather than merely promoting themselves, and they
pose a threat to humans not just as humans but as carriers of opposing
memes. Such memes are especially dangerous because they cut off the
feedback loop that might naturally limit their propagation. Those
memes trigger speech that cannot easily be fought with counter-speech.
Although every idea is an incitement, only some ideas silence their
critics.
Current First Amendment doctrine correctly recognizes that some
forms of legislation are dangerous because they could cut off the feed-
back loop that allows the People to oppose those in power. 93 But our
92. Substituting "illegal harm" for "physical injury" could create circularity problems.
93. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6, at 1061 (6th
ed. 2000).
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First Amendment doctrine has yet to recognize that legislation is not
the only species of dangerous meme. 94 Other, non-legislative speech
can also cut off the feedback loop that is essential to democracy. If
those memes should become loosed on the nation and the Constitution
paralyzes the government, Justice Jackson's fear that the Bill of Rights
becomes a suicide pact may be realized. 95 The rule proposed here is
designed to allow states to straightjacket only these most dangerous
memes. Many other harmful ideas would still be protected. But some
of the worst could be cabined.
B. Comparison with Current United States Constitutional Law
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amend-
ment to protect speakers who voice many kinds of ideas.9 6 But the
protection, to the dismay of Justice Black, 97 has never been absolute. If
the state prohibits behavior or limits access to public fora on a content-
neutral basis, such as by laws prohibiting disruption of public meetings
and disturbing the peace, the law is subject to the reasonable time,
place, and manner test to determine whether it is constitutional.98 The
government can enforce a "quiet zone" outside a hospital, for exam-
ple.Y
The analysis is different if the state looks to content when limiting
speech or access to a traditional public forum such as a street, side-
walk, or park.'" Speech containing certain kinds of memes or meme-
complexes gets no Constitutional protection at all. There is no doubt
that the government can ban outright and penalize fraud, perjury, at-
94. Mark Twain said, "There are laws to protect the freedom of the press's speech, but
none that are worth anything to protect the people from the press." Mark Twain, Address to the
Monday Evening Club of Hartford (1873), in MARK MY WORDS: MARK TWAIN ON WRITING
105 (Mark Dawidziak ed., 1996). The proposal advocated here would allow some such laws to
be passed.
95. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949). I do not mean to imply that Jackson
would agree with the line drawn here. His opinion shows concern for cases in which the gov-
ernment attempts to silence ideology and seems to accept the clear and present danger test.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 25-26. Even Jackson seems unwilling to acknowledge the lasting power
of dangerous memes communicated in a peaceful context.
96. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 93, at 1061 & n.10.
97. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (Black, J., dissenting).
98. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
99. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994) (discussing permissi-
bility of noise control near hospitals and medical facilities).
100. If the regulation applies to speech in non-traditional public fora, the analysis gets com-
plicated. Speech can be limited by subject matter or the identity of the speaker, but cannot be
limited by viewpoint. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48-49
(1983). The line between the subject matter and viewpoint is not entirely predictable. Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995) (stating distinction
between content and viewpoint discrimination is not precise).
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torney malpractice, obscenity,'"' child pornography,"° fighting
words, 10 3 words causing a panic, 04 direct threats of harm,0 5 contracts
to commit crimes, and perhaps criminal facilitation,'0 all without justi-
fying its law under any Constitutional standard of scrutiny. And com-
mercial speech gets only limited, albeit increasingly strong, protection
under the First Amendment.0 7 For speech having content that falls
outside those categories, usually, the government must satisfy "strict
scrutiny" to justify penalizing it on the basis of the idea presented. 0 8
This standard requires that the regulation be necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that there be no less restrictive alternative
regulation that would serve the same purpose."° Political speech has
received this highest level of protection."l1
This Article argues for another entry in the classes of memes that
receive no Constitutional protection. But presenting it as just another
exception on a long list should not hide the fact that this dangerous
speech is not just another type of speech that is low in value because it
is unrelated to the democratic political process. The dangerous ideas
singled out here for non-protection are often quite political and hence
might lie close to the heart of democratic speech.
101. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 38 (1973) (setting forth a three-part test for obscen-
ity).
102. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (upholding ban on child pornography).
103. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (upholding conviction of
speaker who called Marshall a "God damned racketeer" and "[flacist"). But cf. Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (holding overbroad a statute that was not limited to utter-
ances tending to incite an immediate assault). It is not clear how viable this fighting words
exception remains. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 104-05 (1998).
104. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
105. Cf. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (discussed below).
106. See Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997) (publisher of book
on how to be a hit man not protected from civil liability by First Amendment), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1074 (1998).
107. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562-66 (1980) (recognizing that commercial speech receives First Amendment protection).
108. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that "[c]ontent-based regula-
tions are presumptively invalid").
109. One defect in this generalization is that courts have not applied strict scrutiny when
governments punish the promulgation of a computer virus, which is a small bit of information.
The prohibition of computer viruses is a prohibition based on content, the content being the idea
of self-replication on computer hard disks. See, e.g., Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d
275, 286 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that a school could discipline a student for advocat-
ing the use of computer viruses). Likewise, strict scrutiny has not been applied to quarantines
for preventing the spread of bacteria despite the fact that germs contain genetic information. A
quarantine restricts the promulgation of the idea encoded in the genes of the bacterium.
110. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (discussing importance
of unfettered political discourse).
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C. Brandenburg v. Ohio
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,"' the Court reversed the conviction of a
Ku Klux Klan leader who had advocated violence as a means of politi-
cal change in saying "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible
that there might have to be some revengeance taken.', 1 2 The Branden-
burg court said that
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." 3
Suppose that some creed says that all heretics should be killed. Its spe-
cific text reads: "All true believers will employ any and all means to
kill all people who do not advocate the supremacy of the great and
powerful Oz. Do not act hastily, however. Deliberate carefully and
fully before following these tenets. Plan your actions thoughtfully.
Wait for at least one month after reading or hearing these words before
killing anyone." What is the effect of that text? It could persist in the
human environment by creating a strong incentive for our repetition of
its tenets, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of survival of
the vehicles for competing ideas. Can states outlaw such speech under
the current understanding of the U.S. Constitution? Probably not, be-
cause it is not a direct threat of harm by the speaker and the statement
does not satisfy Brandenburg's requirements that it be directed to incit-
ing and likely to produce imminent, lawless action.14
In Hess v. Indiana"5 the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for
disorderly conduct based on Hess's shouting "[w]e'll take the fucking
street later [or] . . . again" during an antiwar demonstration.1 6 The
Court overturned the conviction, saying:
at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal
action at some indefinite future time. . . . [C]onstitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
111. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
112. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
113. Id. at 447.
114. Id.
115. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
116. Hess, 414 U.S. at 107.
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.l7
The Court's insistence that the violence be imminent is also shown in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ,118 in which the Court set aside an
award of damages against Charles Evers for organizing a boycott of
white merchants. Evers had threatened to break the necks of people
who purchased from racist stores.' 19 Applying Brandenburg, the Court
said that no liability could attach because the acts of violence occurred
weeks or months later."'2 Thus, the Brandenburg test prevents punish-
ment for speech that includes a plea for deliberative, rational, thought-
ful, and delayed action even where it can be shown that the speech
leads to human casualties. 12' The standard outlined here would elimi-
nate this imminence requirement. The defenders-of-OZ speech could
be penalized even if the harm resulted after weeks of careful delibera-
tion.
D. Other Applications of the Proposed Rule
Additional examples might help flesh out this rule. "Boycott any-
one who advocates peace" would be protected speech because the
speaker does not advocate or threaten physical harm to any posses-
sions. Likewise with "Do not vote for any politician who advocates
peace." To the same extent as under current law, people would be pro-
tected in urging that other speakers be prevented from gaining property
or position.
"All people with orange eyes should be put to death" would also
be protected to the same degree as under current law. In this case the
new exception to protection would not apply because the incitement to
physical harm is based on the victim's eye color rather than his speech.
The threat does not create any incentive to express or not to express
any particular memes, except perhaps the meme of sunglasses. The
victim's speech is not constrained,"2 and therefore the victim and sym-
pathizers have a viable opportunity to mount a campaign against this
nasty idea.
"Responsible citizens should boycott people with -orange eyes"
117. Id. at 108 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
118. 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
119. Claiborne Hardware Co., 485 U.S. at 900.
120. Id. at 929.
121. Id. at 928.
122. It is conceivable that orange-eyed people would feel less like speaking, so as not to
bring attention to themselves, and they are a group particularly likely to speak out against the
offensive speech. However, no particular idea would be directly repressed.
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would be protected speech both because it does not urge physical harm
and it does not create a disincentive to speak. It does not advocate
physical harm to non-believers on the basis of their being non-
believers. Would the phrase "throw the bum out of office" be subject
to state suppression? No. Despite the reference to throwing, no one
would take it mean that the speaker wished bodily injury to befall the
politician.
By contrast, the state could punish William Randolph Hearst for
entreating someone to put a bullet in President McKinley's head, both
before and after someone tried." Similarly, "All people who advocate
'peace' should be beaten" can be outlawed. Permitting punishment of
this idea may seem backwards because it is more political, and there-
fore closer to the heart of the Bill of Rights' protection, than the idea
that "orange-eyed people should be killed." The key difference lies,
however, in the ability of the former idea to directly influence its own
reproduction. The latter phrase does nothing to protect itself from op-
position. The beat-the-peaceniks idea protects itself by quieting the
voices of those who think it is a bad idea.
In this light, we can see that the speech protected by the Supreme
Court in Terminiello v. Chicago24 might be punished under the stan-
dard proposed here. Terminiello's speech to an audience of "Fellow
Christians ' " in a Chicago church included strong condemnation of
hostile pickets outside the church. 2 6 He called his critics "slimy
scum" 27 and "atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews ,1 28 and
said they had been "imported from Russia." ' He made it abundantly
clear that those holding contrary religious and political views were
offensive.
Whether he advocated harm to them is a closer question. Ter-
miniello said "We must take a Christian attitude. I don't want you to
go from this hall with hatred in your heart for any person, . . ." and
"Walk out of here dignified. The police will protect you. Put the
women on the inside, where there will be no hurt to them. Just walk;
don't stop and argue. 1 30 But he also said, "[t]hey were trained this
afternoon. They are being led; there will be violence[,]" and "[w]e
will not be tolerant of that mob out there. We are not going to be tol-
123. William Randolph Hearst, (visited Mar., 9, 2001)
<http://www.zpub.com/sflhistory/willh.html>.
124. 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
125. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 17.
126. Id.
127. Id. (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).
130. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 20-21.
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erant any longer. We are strong enough. We are not going to be toler-
ant of their smears any longer. We are going to stand up and dare them
to smear us[,]" and "We must not lock ourselves in an upper room for
fear of the Jews. I speak of the Communistic Zionistic Jew, and those
are not American Jews. We don't want them here; we want them to go
back where they came from., 131 Some proof of his intent might also be
found in the pudding. The responses of the audience included: "Jews,
niggers and Catholics would have to be gotten rid of." "Yes, the Jews
are all killers, murderers. If we don't kill them first, they will kill us."
"Yes, send the Jews back to Russia. Kill the Jews." 132 And violence
did indeed follow the meeting, although opponents outside were also at
fault for starting at least some of it.133 If Terminiello was advocating
harm to his critics, the model suggested here would call for a result
different from that reached by the Supreme Court.
Admittedly the standard proposed here would require courts to
make difficult determinations of whether a speaker had advocated
harm. But that is not new. In Watts v. United States,134 the Court over-
turned a speaker's conviction for threatening President Johnson when
he said "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get
in my sights is L.B.J."' 13' The Court found that the defendant had
merely engaged in political hyperbole rather than making a serious
threat.136 Likewise, in Hess v. Indiana,137 if Hess had talked about tak-
ing the streets "now" instead of later, the Court would have had to
determine whether Hess's speech was directed to inciting or producing
lawless action. Thus, although the meme-based approach promoted
here would change the law, the new test would call upon courts to
make the same sorts of determinations regarding intent as must be
made under current interpretations of the Constitution. It is not clear
under current law whether "directed to producing" refers to the con-
tent of the speech or the subjective intent of the speaker, or both.138
Under my runaway-meme test, a state could punish speech only if the
fact-finder were convinced both that the speech could be interpreted as
advocating harm and that the speaker so intended it. 139
The meme-based interpretation of the First Amendment would al-
low states to outlaw some forms of hate speech. "All uppity niggers
131. Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 22.
133. Id. at 3.
134. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
135. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
136. Id. at 708.
137. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
138. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 70 (1998).
139. This proof would have to be beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal context, and
perhaps in the civil context as well.
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deserve whatever they get" might at first seem to be protected, as it is
today (unless it occurs where violence might be imminent). But, under
the rule proposed here, that sentence could be outlawed without in-
fringing the First Amendment right to free speech. First, a court could
easily and reasonably interpret the word "uppity" to refer to persons
who speak out for their interests. Second, the phrase "deserve" could
easily and reasonably be recognized as advocacy of whatever punish-
ment might be inflicted upon them. And third, the word "nigger" has
such strong historic connotations of violence against people of color
that a court could reasonably read "what they get" as referring to
physical harm.
Another type of speech that might qualify for less protection than it
now receives is pornography. Feminist scholars have argued that por-
nography encourages men to treat women as chattels. If the argument
went no further, pornography would qualify as a protected meme even
under this Article's approach. But the argument does go further. Some
feminists argue that pornography silences women who would speak out
against it or speak in favor of some other, pro-women, meme-complex.
If their premise can be proved, if pornography reasonably creates in
women a fear of physical harm for speaking out in opposition to it,
pornography could qualify as a dangerous meme under the test pro-
posed here.
There is concern on many campuses, and maybe more concern off-
campus, about political correctness. According to the philosopher
Daniel Dennett, political correctness is a form of eumemics. 4 Ideas
are squelched by threatening ostracism to those who speak them. How-
ever, ordinary, politically-correct censorship would continue to be con-
stitutionally protected speech because it does not include advocacy of
physical harm to body or property, because job loss is not physical
harm to property. In other words, the word "property" as used here
does not include everything under the "new property" umbrella.
The reader should not conclude that, because politically-correct
censorship would remain protected speech, I think it is not harmful.
For a member of an academic community, or any community, ostra-
cism may be worse than many forms of physical harm to person or
property. Indeed, such censorship may do more net harm to society
than some other speech that would lose protection under the meme-
based test. To that extent, the test proposed here is admittedly imper-
fect. That does not mean, though, that it is not better than the current
approach.
140. DENNETT, supra note 13, at 465.
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E. Advocacy of Other Types of Harm
It is clear from the examples above that this Darwin-based test will
not allow all harmful speech to be outlawed. McCarthyism was both
harmful and tended to silence its opposition, but it would still be pro-
tected speech unless it could be shown to include advocacy of physical
harm to the person or property of the opposition.
Why not go further? To start, I am leaving some speech for later
examination. There are a number of types of speech that are harmful to
people that are currently unprotected, from lies to commercial speech
to "fire." Other areas that now have protection might, with the help of
evolutionary theory, be identified for specific exclusion from the First
Amendment protection. But those areas are outside the scope of this
Article. The focus here is on political speech broadly conceived,
speech about ideas. Even within that limited domain, however, the
proposal here is narrow. Why not adopt more extensive, human-
centered limitations on political speech? For example, Jews have in the
past been precluded from holding public office because of their relig-
ion.'' Those promoting these rules have, by their speech, reduced the
opportunities for those with certain competing (Jewish, in this case)
beliefs to spread their beliefs and created a disincentive to adopting and
expressing those competing beliefs. However, making it illegal to ad-
vocate that persons of certain beliefs should not be allowed to hold
political office would interfere directly with the democratic political
process. Good political campaigns include arguments over whether a
person with certain views should hold office. We want voters to be
able to debate whether the holder of specified beliefs should be elected.
Within the political speech arena, then, we do not want to impede ex-
pression of all speech that undermines opposing ideas.
Possibilities of job loss can be a very effective deterrent to speech,
but they do not qualify as physical harm to person or property under
the rule proposed here. If such non-physical harms were to be in-
cluded, governments could suppress too much speech. If other ap-
proaches can be found that will protect people but also offer little risk
of being used to suppress beneficial speech, they should be consid-
ered.' 42 But for now, no such approaches appear, and the aggressive-
141. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY 100 (1996). Psychologists later attempted to support the claim that Jews were low in
intelligence. See also C.C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 208 (1923). Just
one of the defects in Bringham's study was that he measured recent immigrants that did not
know English as well other subjects. See STEVEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 225
(1981).
142. It might be possible to simply draw a line of distinction between ordinary job loss and
elected office. One situation that would have to be considered is the threat of job loss for an
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speech test proposed here should be limited to advocacy of physical
harm to those who voice competing views. McCarthyism could occur
under the test proposed here, just as it occurred under the broader
reading of the First Amendment supported by the marketplace-of-ideas
metaphor.
F. Hate Crimes
The meme idea might help identify one component of the harm in
some hate crimes. Matthew Shepard, a 105-pound college student, may
have died for having expressed the idea that he was gay or the idea that
his killers might be gay. 43 According to one news story, he was beaten
and crucified for having made suggestive remarks to a man in a Wyo-
ming bar.'" Clearly the actions of the killers are not protected by the
First Amendment, even though there was a component of hateful, in-
tolerant expression in their behavior. Because their behavior is not pro-
tected speech, the proposal above has no direct application to the situa-
tion. However, one principle underlying the proposal is that it is desir-
able to protect the diversity of memes in addition to protecting human
health. Let us suppose that Shepard tried to communicate that "being
gay is Okay," and that his killers did not like that message. If so, these
killers have committed an act that seems designed to silence that ex-
pression and obviously has the potential to do so. For that reason, they
have done more harm than if they had killed in the course of a bur-
glary. Shepard's opposing memes died with him. The hateful ideas
held by his assailants will live a while longer. They have harmed the
meme pool as well as the gene pool. 45 Since the harm is qualitatively
greater, it is reasonable to impose a greater punishment on them than if
their killing had not been in reaction to Shepard's expression. Wyo-
ming does not increase the punishment for crimes of hate, but the the-
ory presented here could support doing so in this situation.
We can see from this example, however, that hate crimes are more
ambiguous memocide than hate speech. With hate speech, we can look
at the speech itself in determining whether it advocates death or harm
elected person based on the speech of her appointees. However, these details might be worked
out and it might be possible to extend the test proposed here to protect speakers from job loss as
well as physical harm. None of this discussion should be taken to suggest that it would be con-
stitutional today to prohibit Jews from holding public office.
143. See James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 are Charged, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1998, at A9.
144. Id.
145. "Kill all the orange-eyed people" may also harm the meme pool, but it is less likely.
Killing orange eyed people kills memes only randomly. There is no reason to believe that it will
kill off any particular memes. In addition, it does not create an incentive for a person to refrain
from voicing any particular memes.
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to holders of opposing ideas. In looking at a murder, we do not always
have words as evidence of whether there was any intent to kill memes
as well as genes. It is hard to tell whether Shepard's killers acted in
part to try to wipe out some meme he had expressed. It is possible, but
highly unlikely, that the killers harbored the meme "it is good to kill
those who express the idea 'Shepard is gay."' Their expression of that
meme could be punished, but they probably did not hold so narrow a
meme. It is more likely that they believed that "it is good to kill those
who express the idea 'I am gay."' Should we increase the severity of
the crime when memocide was a motivation?
Think of the idea "black is beautiful." Do not many black persons
who allow their clothes to expose their skin express that idea? And
could not any killing of a black person by someone who knows her
skin color be interpreted to be an attempt to kill those who express the
idea that black is beautiful? And could not the killing of a black person
lead others to cover up more completely, suppressing the expression of
the idea "black is beautiful"? It is impossible to distinguish between
the persons who kill because the victim was black and the persons who
killed because the victim expressed the idea that he was black. For this
reason, it might be best not to vary the punishment for murder with
whether it was motivated in part by antagonism to a certain meme-
complex. Perhaps a better approach is to look for memocidal speech
and punish it, and apply something like the felony murder rule to in-
crease the penalty for murder when it is accompanied by memocidal
speech.
Would a meme-based version of the First Amendment protect Tu-
pac Shakur's song, Crooked Ass Nigga?4 6 In it, he says, "Coming
quickly up the street, is the punk ass police. The first one jumped out
and said freeze. I popped him in his knees and shot him punk
please."' 47 Assuming that this advocates violence, does it aim the vio-
lence at speakers of opposing thoughts? Certainly the police are viewed
as the opposition and police voluntarily choose to be in that opposition.
The lyrics could easily have the effect of reducing the supply of per-
sons willing to be police. And it could be argued that being a police
officer makes a statement of sorts, perhaps in favor of law and order.
Nevertheless, while it is true that the job of enforcing the law works in
opposition to lawlessness, being a police officer is not speech against
lawlessness. It would not be illogical for a person to take a job on a
police force, say to feed her family, even though she believed in anar-
chy rather than law and order. Enforcing the law is not necessarily an
146. 2PAC, Crooked Ass Nigga, on 2PACALYPSE NOW (Interscope Records/Atlantic
1991).
147. Id.
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expression of the view that the law should be enforced. Some people
just do their jobs.148 Hence, Tupac's speech would remain protected.
G. Abortion Speech
The killing of Dr. Barnett Slepian, a doctor who performed abor-
tions in upstate New York, shows the power of memes.'49 Dr. Slepiapi
might be alive but for the previous statements of right-to-life zealots
following the murders of Drs. David Gunn and John Britton. After his
Florida pro-life murder of Dr. Britton, Paul Hill said "Whatever force
is legitimate in defending a born child is legitimate in defending an
unborn child."' 5 Maybe his words found a responsive environment in
the brain of Slepian's murderer. And the idea lives on, the infection
spreads. Rev. Donald Spitz, director of Pro-Life Virginia, has played
his part as a vehicle of reproduction. He sent a note to Slepian's widow
following the murder which said, "The shooter is a hero. Whatever
action is justified to save the life of a born baby is justified to save the
life of an unborn baby . . . ."'' The idea, kill the abortionists,
predictably metastasized to the Internet, through which it could
reproduce all the faster. A "Christian" web page, "Nuremberg Files,"
listed those who the publishers wanted to see killed, with a line drawn
through Slepian's name.'52 The extended phenotype of this meme-
complex includes dead doctors. Dr. Slepian himself had no doubt about
this. He wrote in a letter to the editor, "'Please don't feign surprise,
dismay and certainly not innocence when a more volatile and less re-
strained member of the group decides to react . . .by shooting an
abortion provider.""" Should this powerful and dangerous meme-
complex be allowed to reproduce?
Under current doctrine, the kill-the-abortionists message is pro-
148. Suppose the state made the belief in enforcing the law a job requirement for officers.
In that situation their joining the force reflects an idea. I would not, however, allow the state to
use this hiring criterion as a means of undermining Tupac's right to sing his song. Indeed, it
would violate freedom of speech to limit police jobs to those holding political views against
anarchy.
149. Jim Yardley & David Rohde, Abortion Doctor in Buffalo Slain; Sniper Attack Fits Vio-
lent Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at Al.
150. Killing Abortionist: A Symposium, (visited Mar. 9, 2001)
<http://www.leaderu.com/ftissueslft9412/killing.html>.
151. Ellen Goodman, Abortion Foes' Use of Violence Isn't Surprising, THE HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 1, 1998, at Outlook Section, 6.
152. The web site, is at <www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html. > The names that
are in grey have been "wounded," the names with a line through them are "fatalities." A fed-
eral jury awarded one hundred million dollars in damages against this web site. The operators
say they will not pay. Rene Sanchez, Doctors Win Suit Over Antiabortion Web Site; Jury Finds
"Hit List, "Awards $07 Million, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
153. See Goodman, supra note, 151, at 6.
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tected speech."5 4 Because it is clear that the statement advocates death
or physical harm to abortion doctors, whether the statement could be
outlawed under the standard promoted here depends on whether per-
forming abortions is a form of speech, an expression of an idea. Doc-
tors might say that their action does not endorse abortion; legal medi-
cine, not endorsement of constitutional rights, is their trade. On the
other hand, if their performance of legal abortions is an expression of
the view that the Constitution gives women, not doctors or legislators,
the right to choose, then the religious meme that says it is right to kill
abortion doctors is an idea that tends to silence its opposition.
In this case, the decision against protection, under the memetic
approach urged here, is made easier by the fact that the Nuremberg
Files advocate death to many different opponents, not only those whose
expression takes the form of action, but also those who speak with
tongues. The web site includes the following lists: "abortionists: the
baby butchers," "clinic owners & workers: their weapons providers
and bearers," "judges: their shysters" (including Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor), "politicians: their mouthpieces" (including Bob Dole),
"law enforcement: their bloodhounds" (including Janet Reno), and
''miscellaneous spouses and other blood flunkies" (including David
Gunn, Jr., the son of David Gunn, the murdered doctor).' 55 Before the
lawsuit, when the reader's cursor rolled over some targets' names, the
program provided the home address and telephone number, to instill
additional fear in the intended victims. It would be hard for these
Christians to argue that they are not trying to silence the opposition.
Advocates of choice will reasonably worry their words will bring them
within the scope of a high powered rifle.
154. Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D.
Or. 1999), vacated by Nos. 99-35320, 99-35331, 99-35252, 99-35333, 99-35327, 99-35405,
2001 WL 293260 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2001) (reversing $100,000,000 judgment for plaintiffs).
The court held the defendants' speech was protected by the First Amendment on grounds that
defendants did not directly threaten plaintiffs or urge imminent acts of violence. Planned Par-
enthood, 2001 WL 293260, at *7. The ACLA did not make direct threats because the statements
did not say that ACLA or its agents would commit violent acts against abortion providers. Id. at
*•1-*2. Statements that merely encourage unrelated terrorists are not direct threats. Id. at *3.
Amazingly, the Ninth Circuit found that ACLA did not call on others to harm abortion provid-
ers. Id. at *6-*7. While the words on the site might not have done so alone, the bloody graphics
and striketype through names of the "baby butchers" made it clear beyond any doubt to this
viewer that they urged viewers to kill the abortion providers, their "blood flunkies," and others
supporting the "wanton slaughter of God's children." The opinion asks whether context can
supply the violent message that language alone leaves out, but pays no attention to effect of the
graphics on the web site. Id. at *5-*6.
155. His father's name has been crossed out on the list of doctors.
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H. Arguments over Amending the First Amendment
What if a politician took up the memetic perspective urged in this
Article, but carried it further than is recommended here? Suppose he
proposed to repeal the First Amendment, citing the great danger of
memes harming people. One response might be, "Memes don't kill
people, People do." Under the analysis here, that position is unten-
able. Another response might be to outlaw his speech. Would that be
allowed under the test proposed here, or is his call for repeal of the
First Amendment protected? Because he urges no harm to those voic-
ing opposition, his speech would be protected and cannot be outlawed.
This leads, of course, to a dilemma. The great weakness of the First
Amendment is that it protects those who attack it. 156 It prevents the
government from defending the current interpretation against the attack
in this Article. And this Article does not advocate making the Constitu-
tion more able to immunize itself from the ideas presented here.
VII. THE NEED TO NARROW THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Many would assert that there is no need to narrow the protections
of the First Amendment. Our system of free speech is too strong to be
undermined by a dangerous meme or meme-complex. The wisdom of
adopting the proposal in this Article hinges on the odds of dangerous
memes spreading and causing harm to humans. Obviously, I cannot
prove that many humans will die unless we modify our interpretation
of the First Amendment or I would have done so pages ago. Nor can I
prove that deaths in the past would not have occurred but for memes.
We will never be completely certain as to causation. We have to make
a guess. My guess is that Barnett Slepian would be alive but for the
Nuremberg Files web site and other expressions of that hateful meme.
The danger goes beyond the horror of individual deaths. I see no
good reason to believe we are immune to memes that would cause
large-scale societal damage, as well as danger to individuals. We are
vulnerable to memes that may undermine democracy and free speech
itself in the future. The Nazis used free speech to gain power and then
156. See Justice Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 35 (1949). He
quotes Joseph Goebbels as saying,
[w]hen democracy granted democratic methods for us in the times of opposition,
this [Nazi seizure of power] was bound to happen in a democratic system. How-
ever, we National Socialists never asserted that we represented a democratic point
of view, but we have declared openly that we used democratic methods only in or-
der to gain the power and that, after assuming the power, we would deny to our
adversaries without any consideration the means which were granted to us in the
times of [our] opposition.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 35.
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curtailed it to maintain their power. The fact that there are few that
would attack freedom of speech in the U.S. today is no cause to be
sanguine. Nazism under Hitler did not take long to develop. The peo-
ple who helped and allowed it were not alien beings teleported to
earth; they were human beings, as are we. What would make our cul-
ture able to fend off memocidal nationalistic memes when the German
culture did not? Certainly our cultural antibodies were insufficient to
prevent a cultural bout of McCarthyism just a few years later. Infec-
tions of dangerous memes can spread quickly precisely because they
have the power to stifle production of the antidote; they muffle opposi-
tion. It is true that, so far and for the most part, the good memes have
eventually defeated the bad ones. But nothing ensured that result. And,
even if the good memes will always win in the end, the unfathomable
agony caused by Nazism and the terrifically high costs of containing
the bad memes once unloosed are enough to justify some preventative
measures. If we could travel back to 1932,157 surely we would be will-
ing to give up at least some freedom of speech (the freedom to advo-
cate harm to speakers) to save millions of innocent lives.
Perhaps it is possible to invent a meme-complex that will protect us
from the dangerous memes so that we can let them float freely in dis-
course rather than subjecting their speakers to quarantine. Could we
not inoculate ourselves against the bad memes? Nazism did generate
antibodies that still exist in the population today, squelching some of
the dangerous memes before they take hold. But even Nazism, which
was far more virulent a strain than we would ever wish to inject into
ourselves, was not enough to prevent a different virulent meme,
McCarthyism, from sweeping through the minds of those who fought
Hitler. So the task is difficult.
One purpose of this Article is to invent a good meme, one that
fights dangerous memes. By pointing out the insidious nature of dan-
gerous memes, their ability to cut off the feedback loop that protects us
from them, I hope to heighten our vigilance. Ironically, the more the
idea in this Article replicates, the less we may need a constitutional
amendment or reinterpretation. The more you hate my normative ar-
gument for restricting the First Amendment, the harder you should
work to propagate my descriptive proposition. Unfortunately, even if it
triggers other articles (as Dawkins' book spawned it), replications of
this Article in ordinary academic channels cannot be successful enough
to protect us. The dangerous memes have time on their side. For this
meme (or any other) to have a chance against them, it needs some form
157. Of course, we cannot pinpoint the time at which the Nazi meme could have been
stopped, but 1932 might have been early enough.
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of super-meme status, it needs to be incorporated into a more powerful
idea, it needs to be part of the law.
The need to restrict the First Amendment increases as communica-
tions become speedier. Human evolution proceeds today at about the
same pace as it has for millennia. Ideas, however, have dramatically
increased their rate of replication during recent centuries. The first
huge step was Gutenberg's invention of the printing press with mov-
able type. It allowed a meme to replicate much faster than it could
have done by the quills of monks or the voice of the most powerful
orator. Another important step was the Pony Express, followed later
by other improvements in transportation such as the automobile and
airplane. Marconi and Tychociner of course did their part to enhance
meme replication, greatly surpassing the speed of earlier transmissions
over great distances, although the number of listeners was severely
limited by the cost of electronic ears. Telephones, radio, and televi-
sion, in turn, enhanced the replication rate for ideas. And more lately,
the Internet has speeded the global transmission of meme-complexes,
such as the truth of Fermat's last theorem, to nearly the speed of light.
Via computers and the net, ideas can be replicated with very few re-
sources. As their rate of replication increases, so does the chance of a
dangerous meme taking hold. Computers thus exacerbate the problem
created when people have bad ideas.
Not only is there a greater ability for a bad meme to sweep through
a human population, increased replication rates open up additional op-
portunities for bad memes to arise. Because replication is imperfect, as
memes replicate faster, they can mutate faster. Modern electronic rep-
lications are much less prone to accidental errors than mouth-to-mouth
replications, so unintentional or accidental mutations might not happen
any quicker than in the past. But intentional mutations are easily cre-
ated and the huge number of replications gives countless opportunities
for intentional modification. Technology has increased the sheer num-
ber of different memes. Since there is no reason to believe that the
dangerous replicators are diminishing as a percentage of all ideas, an
increase in numbers means an increase in the number of bad memes
and a greater chance that a really big, nasty one will be created. More-
over, we should expect that memes, like other evolving organisms, will
with time become better adapted to their environment.
Finally, memes have a huge advantage over genes in that new com-
binations can be made out of very different parents. For the most part,
so far, genes of horses could not get together with genes of humans to
make viable new genes. As is proved by the centaur, memes are not
similarly limited. Just as sexual reproduction leads to vastly quicker
variation than asexual reproduction, memetic combination will lead to
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lead to far quicker variation in memes than sexual reproduction creates
in genes. Sexual mating requires that the mates share a common ances-
tor in the not-too-distant past. By contrast, your ideas and my ideas can
get together to form new ideas without regard to whether our ideas
came from some common memetic stock.
Memes have the advantage of being able to evolve by Lamarckian
evolution. They need not rely on mutation of the genotype. The pheno-
types that acquire beneficial adaptations can pass them on. More
quickly than genes, memes will find ways to group together with other
memes to make increasingly fit carriers. They have not had much time
to adapt, but some have already become quite hearty. It is hard to
imagine how robust ideas may become in the future. In other words,
we haven't seen the worst yet.
A. Computers
Although computers make bad speech especially dangerous, it is
doubtful that lines can or will be drawn allowing suppression of com-
puter communications when the same speech would be protected in
other fora.'58 Networked computers have too much potential for im-
proving democracy. It might be thought that Internet speech is less
dangerous than the same speech in person. Unlike someone on a picket
line, a person using a computer to urge harm to carriers of the oppos-
ing ideas rarely has an opportunity to actually inflict physical harm on
them. Moreover, there is less opportunity on the Internet for anyone
else to identify the persons with the heretical views. As a dog in a New
Yorker cartoon put it, "On the Internet, no one knows you're a
dog. '"5 9 All these points ought not reduce our fears about Internet
speech, however. The Internet can still be used to promulgate speech
such as "Kill the heretics," which can have the effect of discouraging
heretics from speaking in other fora. As a result, Internet speech
should also be subject to the dangerous meme exception to First
Amendment protection.
So far, this Article has assumed that ideas are generated by people.
But it is easy to see that computers are increasingly in the business of
generating ideas. It might not be too long before we will not be able to
distinguish between ideas generated by a computer and ideas generated
by a human. Computers can already generate complicated "ideas" such
as chess strategies and improvements to grammar. Ideas no longer re-
158. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-61, 868-85 (1997) (invalidating the "indecent
transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996).
159. Peter Steiner, THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.
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quire a human underwriter to be created or to replicate. And search
engines exist to look regularly for occurrences of certain ideas. Web
site operators make money based on the number of times that other
computers "hit" a web site."6 Computer owners in the future, like
academics, advertisers, rock stars, and playwrights today, may be paid
for generating ideas that are reiterated by others. In addition, com-
puters create possibilities for new variations on the ancient chain letter
and pyramid scheme. In many ways today, and in more ways in the
future, the more "popular" an idea, the more profitable it could be.
And popularity need not be measured by human appreciation.
Economic incentives are now in place for programmers to design
programs that generate and replicate ideas that other computers will
access and replicate. Should such computer programs be free, in the
name of free speech, to generate whatever programs are most competi-
tive? Should a computer virus, or virus generating program, be pro-
tected by the principle of free speech? It seems likely that computers
will generate ideas that are harmful to people, though popular with
computers or even other people. What will and should happen if the
government tries to outlaw such ideas? Certainly the owners of the
programs will object on the grounds of free speech. Should courts
honor their free-speech defense?
We will not be able to deny free-speech protection on the ground
that only human speech counts because we will be unable to distinguish
effectively between computer-generated ideas and human-generated
ideas. Even today it is difficult to determine the source of an idea that
starts with a computer search for and downloading of, certain types of
cases, followed by human selection of ones that are closely related in
an interesting way, followed by a grammar check and improvement
done by the computer, and an automatic mailing to all members of a
certain list. A major reason for computerization is to substitute com-
puter effort for more expensive human effort. As software becomes
more sophisticated, the portion of human effort in the final product
diminishes. It will be quite difficult, and I think not fruitful, to try to
limit free-speech rights on the basis that a computer has contributed
substantially to the speech.
A rule drawn by reference to the aggressiveness of ideas may pro-
vide a solution. Indeed, the law already recognizes that governments
must have the power to stop aggressive memes. The creation of com-
puter viruses may be punished. Prohibiting viruses does not, on its
face, seem to be content neutral. So why is it allowed?
Perhaps this content restriction is allowed because the government
160. The rewards can come from both direct charges to users and advertising revenues.
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seeks to avert a certain kind of harm unrelated to the content of the
virus. The state may punish people who express themselves by vandal-
izing cemeteries because the law is not aimed at any particular content.
States may punish those who disrupt lawful meetings on the same ba-
sis: the state is not trying to protect or preclude any particular idea.
Likewise, the state might punish the virus communicator, because the
virus does harm that is not related to any particular communication;
there is no identifiable idea that the government tries to protect.
But this rationale is not completely satisfying because the virus
would do no harm if there were no idea on the hard disk. The virus
does its harm solely by harming other memes and the government aims
to protect ideas, those that are not viruses. Put the other way around,
the government attempts to preclude a particular idea even though it is
not trying to protect any particular idea. 6'
The virus differs from an innocuous message only in its content.
One could find no indicator of a virus in the electrons streaming
through telephone wires, the holes burned into the compact disc, or the
magnetic charge on a floppy or hard disk. The difference between vi-
ruses and other messages is that the placement of the positive and
negative magnetic charges on a tape or computer disc, or the placement
of the pits on a compact disc, is changed. Only by understanding the
code can one tell a virus from many non-viruses. And the harm done
by a virus is only to ideas, ideas that were in competition with the vi-
rus for valuable disk space. The evolutionary approach proposed here
would, at least in a general way, support our sensible conclusion that
the communication of a computer virus should not be protected by the
First Amendment. The virus, like the other dangerous ideas discussed
above, is harmful because it attacks opposing ideas. It attempts to dis-
able the very ideas that would fight against it. That is just the sort of
idea that we should push outside the protective ambit of the Constitu-
tion.
B. The Need for an International Solution
As shown by the premature news that Fermat's last theorem had
been proved, the Internet makes possible quick international communi-
cation of false ideas. Plainly, ideas generated in one country may do
harm in another. And that harm may occur even though the idea is not
replicated in the harmed country. To take a simple example, a zealot
hearing the Ayatollah's message in the Mid-East might travel to
161. This is the obverse of Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). There, the prohibi-
tion on some uses of the flag was an attempt to protect a certain message of patriotism, although
the government did not attempt to preclude any particular message. Spence, 418 U.S. at 405-15.
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Europe to try to follow its prescription against Rushdie. Moreover, it
will be very difficult, probably impossible, to attempt to stop harmful
ideas at our national borders. For these reasons, it will be important
for human welfare to find an international solution so that harmful
speech can be outlawed at its point of origin rather than trying to deal
with its effects everywhere it is read. Even if we cannot negotiate in-
ternational solutions, however, we should not give up on national solu-
tions. Stopping replication within our borders is as important as pre-
venting entry. Knowing that all of the calls for harm come from out-
side our country may give us some freedom to speak our opposing
views.
C. A Library of Bad Memes
In the interests of science we preserve some very dangerous bacte-
ria. We might similarly wish to keep alive some very dangerous ideas.
Just as we take extensive precautions to protect the public from the
harmful bacteria, we should protect the public from the dangerous
memes. We could and maybe should put all illegal memes in a high
security library. Anyone wanting to contribute ideas to that library
would be allowed to do so. The public might or might not be given
entry to read in this library. But photocopying and similar reproductive
techniques would definitely not be permitted. I do not argue that any
ideas should become extinct. 62 Governments should be allowed, how-
ever, to confine the most dangerous ones to a memetic Jurassic Park.
CONCLUSION
It could be argued, quite accurately, that the concrete proposal of-
fered here does not go far enough. Ideas can do much injury to hu-
mans, and this new reading of the First Amendment would not reduce
the protection given many harmful ideas. States could not outlaw much
more than they can already outlaw. In a way, that is a strength of the
proposal; operationally, it is not radical. Our constitutional rights
should not change rapidly. This proposal would allow states to crimi-
nalize only a little more speech than under current law.
Is such a small change worth it? Perhaps so. It could be very im-
portant to a few people if it saves their lives. And, although it is
162. The smallpox virus is so dangerous that some people think it should be eradicated en-
tirely. Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer, THE NEW YORKER, July 12, 1999, at 44. It
is possible that there are ideas that have a similar capacity to wipe out tens of millions of people
in short order, but I think the law should presume, until it is shown otherwise, that no meme can
kill so many so quickly.
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unlikely that a virulent memocidal meme will invade the American
body politic, who can say that an updated mutation of Hitler's Nazism
is impossible? The odds are low, but the consequences are so grave
that it may be worth buying some insurance against the contingency.
Justice Jackson may be right that "[iun the long run, maintenance of
free speech will be more endangered if the population can have no pro-
tection from the abuses which lead to violence."
6 3
Setting aside the normative issues, this Article argues for changing
the meme we use to describe human adoption of ideas. Justice Holmes
said:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ..... That, at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an ex-
periment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowl-
edge. "
This marketplace-of-ideas meme has forerunners in our nation's early
history. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "[w]e have nothing to fear from the
demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate
their errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first
criminal act produced by the false reasonings; these are safer correc-
tions than the conscience of the judge."' 65 Jefferson, Holmes, and
Brandeis believed that bad speech can be countered with good speech.
These three brilliant lights may be excused for not recognizing that
time for rebuttal, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition to cre-
ate a fair opportunity for rebuttal of a memocidal bad idea.166 When
they wrote, evolutionary theory had not yet been applied to ideas. It is
time to replace the marketplace metaphor with a better one, the prime-
163. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949). But see State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that, "[f]reedom to differ is not limited to things
that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order").
164. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elijah Boardman, New Milford, Conn. (July 3,
1801), quoted in Charles A. Beard, The Great American Tradition: A Challenge for the Fourth
of July, 123 THE NATION 7, 8 (1923); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Note that the quotation does include the premise that "others are left
free" to demonstrate errors. The point is that some kinds of speech eliminate that very freedom.
166. I confess that I am not entirely comfortable saying that Jefferson, Holmes, and
Brandeis are all in error. Even the greatest brains, however, can harbor memes that are wrong.
Both theory and experience have taught, since they spoke, that bad ideas can be quite catchy.
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val soup. 67 In this primeval soup, some ideas survive and some do not.
And we are part of the soup, the environment, and have some power to
influence the results. But we are not in complete control of our memes.
And the ideas that eventually survive in this primeval soup will not
necessarily be our friends.1
61
An important point of this Article is that the evolutionary struggle
for survival is not just among ideas or among people, but also between
ideas and people. This struggle is not expressed by the marketplace-of-
ideas metaphor often invoked in policy discussions of the First
Amendment. But the us-versus-them model is also too simple; it ig-
nores the interconnection between us and them. People are a product
not only of genes, but also of memes. Our minds are constructed in
part by our experience and some of our experience is invasion by
memes. Memes have structured our minds to make us who we are.
1 69
We are the phenotype of both our genes and our memes. To the extent
that there are bad human consequences of free speech, the strong free
speech advocate might say that "[w]e have met the enemy, and he is
us. 170 But this approach, like the marketplace metaphor, fails to rec-
ognize that ideas have power too. They make up a big part of us, but
they are not merely parts of us.
People are not always the enemy; sometimes ideas are the enemy.
Some ideas are better and some are worse for human survival, for cul-
tural survival, and even for idea survival. Some ideas will make us into
people we do not want to be. To ignore this is to deny the power of
ideas. Some might argue it is a "morally unacceptable proposition that
words alone can overcome human will."17' It is not obvious to me that
an acknowledgment that "words alone" can influence behavior is a
denial of free will; but, if one has to pick between the two, the teacher
in me cannot give up the belief that mere words do influence behavior,
and sometimes in ways that are not entirely welcomed by the listener.
Songs spread from my daughter Laura to her sister Alison and back
again. They say they have no control. But they do have some control.
Richard Dawkins notes that we humans are special in that we have the
power to rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.'72 As one
167. In a personal conversation, Owen Jones suggested an alternative, the "breeding ground
of ideas."
168. As Dawkins puts it, "There is nothing magic about Darwinian fitness in the genetic
sense. There is no law giving it priority as the fundamental quantity that is maximized."
DAWKINS, supra note 1, at 110.
169. DENNETT, supra note 13, at 365.
170. Walt Kelly, 1971 Earth Day Cartoon, Pogo speaking to Porkypine, (visited May 23,
2001) <http://www.igopogo.com/we-have-met.htm>.
171. See David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test,
73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1217 (1998).
172. As John Hiatt would say, "we can choose, we ain't no amoebas." JOHN HIATT, Thing
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small part of that rebellion, we must overthrow the "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor which itself reinforces and legitimates the tyranny of
selfish replicating memes.
Called Love, on THE BEST OF JOHN HIATT: BACKLOT COLLECTION (A&M Records 1988).
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